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EMINENT DOMAIN, PROPERTY RIGHTS, AND THE SOLUTION
OF REPRESENTATION REINFORCEMENT
PAUL BOUDREAUXt
ABSTRACT

Courts at both the federal and state level are busy remaking the law
of eminent domain. Property rights advocates argue that courts should
scrutinize more closely government's ability to take property with plans
to transfer it to private developers. But asking courts to second-guess
the wisdom of governmentalpolicy decisions cannot be a workable solution. Instead, eminent domain could be tightened by relying on the idea
of representationreinforcement, through which courts boost the interests
of those groups who are unlikely to have their voices heard in the political realm. Across the nation, local governments are using eminent domain to discourage residency by poor persons. This articleproposes
that eminent domain be constitutionally impermissible when it is both
used to take land destinedfor private hands anddisproportionatelyhurts
the poor orpolitically disadvantaged.
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INTRODUCTION

Strange legal bedfellows are clamoring for limits on government's
power of eminent domain over private property. On the political right,
property rights advocates lament the ease by which governments have
been able to take private property for projects that libertarians view with
skepticism.' They cite cases such as Hawaii's colossal redistribution of
land in the 1980s, which the United States Supreme Court upheld despite
its resemblance to socialism, 2 and Illinois's selling its power of eminent
domain for a small "fee." 3 On the left, advocates for the poor argue that
businesses with political and financial clout often are able to sway local
governments into taking land (with monetary compensation, of course)
from less powerful persons, including racial minorities, and then giving it
to more influential groups, under the guise of economic growth.4 They
point to cases in which local authorities "condemned" land from poorer
persons in order to serve the desires of corporate titans such as Donald
Trump and the General Motors Corporation. 5

1. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT
DOMAIN 83, 161, 177-81 (1985) (criticizing the broad reach of eminent domain at the end of the
twentieth century).
2.
See Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241-43 (1984). In Midkiff, the Supreme
Court approved Hawaii's wide-ranging Land Reform Act, through which the state used eminent
domain and took many parcels of land owned by large landowners and sold them to families who
had been living on the land as renters. See id. at 231-32. This program, which resembled socialist
land redistribution, was justified in part by Hawaii's unique history, in which a nearly feudal system
of landownership by a handful of leading families continued beyond statehood, which occurred in
1960. See id.at 232-33. In the 1960s, the government found that more than 90 percent of privately
owned land was held by only 72 private individuals. See id.at 232. It is questionable whether such
a land redistribution plan would have received the approval that it did if it had been undertaken in,
say, Texas or New York. Midkiffrelied on Berman v. Parker,348 U.S. 26 (1954), in which the court
rejected a challenge to the District of Columbia's plan to redevelop "slums" and set forth highly
deferential standards for reviewing the government's decisions and exercising eminent domain, even
in cases in which the taken land is slated to be given to private developers. Midkiff, at 239-40.
3.
See Sw. I11.
Dev. Auth. v. Nat'l City Envtl., LLC, 768 N.E.2d 1, 10 (Il1. 2002). The Illinois Supreme Court held that the Illinois system, under which local governments in effect held the
right to sell their exercise of eminent domain to private developers willing to pay a fee, exceeded the
government's powers under the Illinois constitution. Id. at 10-11.
4.
See, e.g., Wendell E. Pritchett, The "Public Menace" of Blight: Urban Renewal and the
PrivateUses of Eminent Domain, 21 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 1, 32-36 (2003) (giving a history of the
government's using the designation of "blight" to exclude poor persons and African Americans);
David H. Harris, Jr., The Battlefor Black Land: FightingEminent Domain, NBA NAT'L BAR ASS'N
MAG., Mar.-Apr. 1995, at 12, available at 9-APR NBAM 12 (Westlaw).
5.
See Casino Reinvestment Dev. Auth. v. Banin, 727 A.2d 102, 103 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law
Div. 1998); Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455, 458 (Mich. 1981),
overruledby County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004). In Banin, New Jersey's
Atlantic City casino development agency sought to take by eminent domain a small retail store, in
order to give developer Donald Trump more room for expansion of the Trump Plaza casino complex. See 727 A.2d at 110. The New Jersey court departed from earlier precedent and held that the
action did not serve the "public interest." Id. at 111. A number of other state courts followed with
opinions more skeptical of governmental assertions of "public use." See, e.g., City of Springfield v.
Dreison Inves., Inc., Nos. 19991318, 991230, 000014, 2000 WL 782971, at *1 (Mass. Super. Ct.
Feb. 25, 2000) (overturning use of eminent domain for the purpose of the development of a privately
owned minor league baseball stadium); City of Novi v. Robert Adell Children's Funded Trust, 659
N.W.2d 615, 617 (Mich. Ct. App. 2002). See also Corey J. Wilk, The Struggle Over the Public Use
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In 2004 and 2005, the grumbling over eminent domain bubbled over
into the courts and into the public discourse. First, County of Wayne v.
Hathcock overruled the most notoriously deferential state court opinion
that allowed government to seize private land and turn it over to private
businesses in the name of economic development. 6 Second, four dissenting Justices of the United States Supreme Court, in Kelo v. City of New
London,7 called for a significant tightening of the federal constitutional
law of property rights against eminent domain,8 although a slim majority
of the Court refused to budge from the precedent of a deferential standard of review. 9 Third, in the wake of Kelo, critics from state legislators
to comic strip cartoonists have called for new steps to restrict government's ability to condemn private property.' 0 This political and judicial
Clause: Survey of Holdings and Trends, 1986 - 2003, 39 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 251, 257-61
(2004), for a discussion of developments in state courts.
6.
684 N.W.2d 765, 769-70 (Mich. 2004), overruling Poletown Neighborhood Council v.
City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981). Poletown held that the taking of a neighborhood for
a new General Motors factory was a permissible exercise of eminent domain because the city asserted that it provided a "public benefit," which in turn satisfied the state constitution's requirement
that eminent domain be used for "public use." 304 N.W.2d at 459.
7.
125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005), affg Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500 (Conn. 2004).
In Kelo, discussed in Part I, landowners challenged the exercise of eminent domain by the City of
New London, Connecticut, which planned to use their properties for a development project, which
would include land for a new facility of Pfizer Inc. See id. at 2658-61. New London hoped that the
project would help revitalize its economically depressed downtown. Id. at 2658-59. The landowners argued to the Court that the condemnation violated the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, which states, "[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation."
See id. at 2658; U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Supreme Court majority, which included Justices
Stevens (who wrote the Court's opinion), Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, upheld the city's
action, applying the traditionally deferential standard to reviewing eminent domain, through which
government must compensate the landowner. See 125 S. Ct. at 2665. The Court held that eminent
domain is constitutional as long as it to serve a "public purpose," even if the condemned land is
destined for private hands. See id.
8.
See 125 S. Ct. at 2675 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (Rehnquist, C.J., Scalia & Thomas, JJ.,
joining in dissent).
9.
See id. at 2663-65 (majority opinion).
10.
The public reaction to Kelo has been remarkably vocal, especially in a year in which most
of the public debate centered on foreign affairs. See, e.g., Ken Hearny, High-court Seizure Decision
Sparks Uprising, BALT. SuN, July 24, 2005, at 4L, available at 2005 WLNR 11644508 (noting the
nationwide negative political reaction to Kelo, including the adoption of a resolution in the U.S.
House of Representatives deploring the decision); Shannon O'Boye, Politicians Trying to Ease
Public's Fearof Governments Seizing Property,S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, July 27, 2005, at BI, available at 2005 WLNR 11795323 (noting legislative initiatives at both the federal and state levels to
restrain local governments); Rosa Brooks, It's Open Season on Private Property, L.A. TIMES, July
27, 2005, at B 13, availableat 2005 WLNR 11848751 (criticizing Kelo). In an interesting example
of a seemingly dry property rights issue reaching unexpected locations, at least three nationally
syndicated comic strips have weighed in against excessive domain for private development. See Jeff
Millar
&
Bill
Hinds,
Tank
McNamara
(July
26,
2005),
available at
http://cervo.net/comics/?id2-rm&coicdate=7 / 2F26 /2F2005; Bruce Tinsley, Mallard Fillmore
(July 18, 2005), availableat http://jewishworldreview.com/strips/mallard/2000/mallard07I805.asp;
Scott Santis, Prickly City (Mar. 8, 2005) (on file with author) (one of a series of anti-eminentdomain strips in a conservative-oriented cartoon). Also amusing was the effort of property rights
advocates to have the government of Weare, New Hampshire, use eminent domain to take the home
of Justice Souter by eminent domain and turn it into a motel. Hearny, supra.
At least some liberal commentators have come to the defense of Kelo, albeit somewhat
reluctantly. See, e.g., Editorial, Eminent Latitude, WASH. POST, June 24, 2005, at A30, available at
2005 WLNR 9994769 (concluding that a higher scrutiny of "public use" would be troublesome);
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clamor may eventually revolutionize the government's authority, as the
however, local governcritics have demanded."' It may also hamstring,
12
ments' ability to foster urban redevelopment.
A number of social phenomena have strengthened the chorus
against eminent domain, including its often-toothless "public use" requirement. 13 First, the scales have fallen from the nation's eyes over the
effectiveness of urban "renewal" projects, some of which have been
driven as much by racism and profit-seeking as by a good faith desire to
renew urban areas.14 Moreover, many local governments, especially the
cash-poor central cities, are trying ever harder to raise revenue by attracting businesses and wealthy residents - and discouraging the poor - thus
making an eminent domain an irresistible tool.' 5
Frustration with eminent domain has led to many proposals for reform. Suggestions in recent years include: (1) requiring more procedural
hurdles before a government can take property; 16 (2) limiting eminent
domain to cases in which the public, not a private party, retains the own-

Richard Cohen, Take Life, but Not My House, WASH. POST, July 26, 2005, at A19, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/07/25/AR2005072501334.htm
(syndicated column) (criticizing conservatives for caring more about government's taking of property
than of life).
11. See, e.g., James E. Krier & Christopher Serkin, The Death of Poletown: The Future of
Eminent Domain and Urban Development After County of Wayne v. Hathcock: Public Ruses, 2004
MICH. ST. L. REV. 859, 859-60 (2004) (suggesting that the "subject of public use is back on the
table, with a good chance of substantial change in the law across the country").
See, e.g., Elizabeth F. Gallagher, Breaking New Ground: Using Eminent Domain for
12.
Economic Development, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1837, 1865-73 (2005) ("Property owners should not
be protected by narrowing the public use requirements so much that eminent domain can never be
used for economic development projects because then many of these projects could not be completed, nor any of their benefits to the community realized.")
13.
As interpreted by most courts in the twentieth century, the public-use restriction has meant
merely that government had to assert that the condemnation served the public interest in some way.
See Haw. Hous. Auth., 467 U.S. at 241 (applying U.S. constitutional law) (citing Berman v. Parker,
348 U.S. 26 (1954)); Poletown Neighborhood Council, 304 N.W.2d at 480 (Mich. 1981) (applying
Michigan constitutional law), rev'd by County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich.
2004).
For a sample of critiques of the toothless public-use standard, see, e.g., Nicole Stelle
Garnett, The Public-Use Question as a Takings Problem, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 934, 934-38
(2003) (arguing that courts should employ in reviewing eminent domain the more skeptical standard
used in scrutinizing government "exactions" on private owners); Ralph Nader & Alan Hirsh, Making
Eminent Domain Humane, 49 VILL. L. REV. 207, 219-24 (2004) (calling for a tighter standard for
eminent domain destined for private ownership, especially when the property owners are politically
less powerful).
14.
See Pritchett, supra note 4, at 7-47 (giving the history of the deferential standard and
blaming both racism and gullibility of the prospects of "urban renewal").
15.
See, e.g., PAUL KANTOR, THE DEPENDENT CITY REVISITED: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
URBAN DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIAL POLICY 2 (1995) (arguing that local governments must inces-

santly seek to please business to attract dollars and balance their budgets).
16.
Professor Garnett has provided a list of "short cuts" to eminent domain that could trigger
tougher judicial scrutiny. See Garnett, supra note 13, at 970-82. Among these is a "quick-take"
process designed to facilitate and speed up the condemnation process. See id.
at 970-74. By imposing more hurdles to eminent domain, as opposed to fewer, legal reform might be able to weed out
justifiable exercises from those that are suspect. See id.
at 982.

2005]

EMINENT DOMAIN

5

ership of the land; 17 (3) allowing private use of condemned land only8
under limited circumstances, as set forth in the new Hathcock decision;

and (4) reversing the usual presumption of deference, so that the government has the burden of justifying the public value of its development
plan.' 9

In the last category, Professor Nicole Stelle Garnett has sug-

gested the skeptical standard that the Supreme Court has imposed in reviewing government "exactions" from land owners in return for granting
permits.20 Such reforms seem to harmonize with the Rehnquist Court's
activism in protecting property rights through the United States Constitution's Fifth Amendment.2 '
I contend, however, that a reversal of the presumptions under eminent domain is bound to be unsatisfactory. Demanding more exacting
scrutiny of the justifications for eminent domain is likely to lead courts
into an inextricable bog of trying to assess and weigh the benefits of pub-

lic development projects - a fact-finding job that is a legislative, not judicial, function. Even if a court were to able to reach conclusions as to
the efficacy of public projects, the most likely successful challengers
under a complex balancing test would be wealthy, corporate, and institu17.
The effort to restrict eminent domain is largely limited to targeting cases in which the
government does not plan to use the property for government purposes. See Katherine M.
McFarland, Privacy and Property: Two Sides of the Same Coin: The Mandatefor Stricter Scrutiny
for Government Uses of Eminent Domain, 14 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 142, 142-43 (2004). This approach is driven, of course, by the fact that the U.S. Constitution and those of many states limit
eminent domain to cases of "public use." See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. V; MICH. CONST. art. X, §
2. It is worth noting, however, that the arguments of "property rights" against eminent domain have
no force when government does take land for governmental purposes, such as for schools, police
stations, parks, etc. See McFarland, supra at 142-43, 146-47. It is difficult, therefore, to assert that
private property is "sacrosanct," Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 769, considering that almost no one
suggests that government is restricted from taking private property for a city office building.
18.
Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 781-85, 787. The Michigan Supreme Court wrote that eminent
domain destined for private ownership is permissible when (1) private assembly of large tracts of
land for "instrumentalities of commerce," such as railroads, would be financially difficult, because
of the incentive for landowners to "hold out," (2) the private ownership is still accountable to the
public, such as for highly regulated service industries, and (3) the condemnation is based on "public
concern" with the land itself, such as is the case with slum clearance. Id. at 781-84.
19.
See, e.g., Stephen J. Jones, Trumping Eminent Domain Law: An Argument for Strict
Scrutiny Analysis Under the Public Use Requirement of the Fifth Amendment, 50 SYRACUSE L. REV.
285, 310-14 (2000) (arguing for a reversal of the presumption in favor of constitutionality when
taken land is destined for private ownership); Nancy K. Kubasek, Time to Return to a Higher Standard of Scrutiny in Defining Public Use, 27 RUTGERS L. REc. 3 (2003) (calling for a requirement
that government give "substantial evidence" of public benefits when taking property destined for
private ownership).
20. See generally Garnett, supra note 13 (arguing for judicial review of eminent domain
destined for private ownership using the standard for "exactions," set forth in Nollan v. Cal. Coastal
Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987), where the Court found that an exaction must have a "nexus" to
the harm for which it purportedly compensates, and Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391
(1994), where the Court established that the nexus must be "roughly proportional" to the harm).
21.
See, e.g., Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 626-30 (2001) (holding that a property
right against a regulatory taking is not lost simply because the property is sold after the regulation is
imposed); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1030 (1992) (holding that a land use regulation is a compensable taking of private property if it prohibits "all economically productive or
beneficial use of the land"); Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837 (finding that an exaction must have a "nexus" to
the harm for which it purportedly compensates); Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391 (establishing that the nexus
must be "roughly proportional" to the harm).
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tional property owners - hardly the categories of persons for whom we
should expend most of our sympathy over the abuses of eminent domain.
After all, eminent domain is perhaps the only major exercise of state
power in which poorer persons suffer more than they would in the absence of government.
Instead of having courts scrutinize the justification for taking property, I propose that courts focus more straightforwardly on the individual
targets of eminent domain. In crafting my proposal, I rely on the "representation reinforcement" theory of the late Professor John Hart Ely, who
argued that judicial review should concentrate not on particular outcomes
but on assuring that all categories of persons receive adequate representation in the political and legislative processes.2 2 I propose that eminent
domain should be impermissible in those instances in which government
takes the homes predominantly of poorer persons, and then transfers the
land to private parties. In these cases, we have strong reason to suspect
that the targets of eminent domain did not get adequate representation in
the legislative and administrative branches of government. A tougher
standard for eminent domain and "public use" should focus on trying to
ensure that poor persons are not forced to lose their homes simply because they are poor.
I. EMINENT DOMAIN LAW, FROM THE FIFTH AMENDMENT TO
HATHCOCK AND KELO

With one of the more cryptic passages of the United States Constitution, the framers ended the Fifth Amendment with a clause stating,
"[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation., 23 Nearly all state constitutions hold some sort of similar requirement.24 What is missing from the Constitution is a statement of
authority for "taking" private property. The rather inchoate governmental power of eminent domain, fairly well established in English law by
the late eighteenth century, was simply assumed. 5 Moreover, the Fifth
Amendment does not squarely state that eminent domain can only be
exercised for "public use;" literally, the clause states only that just compensation be given in those instances in which property is taken for public use. Federal courts, however, have assumed that the public use reference is a threshold requirement for the exercise of eminent domain.26 A
number of scholars, including Professor Donald Kochan, have concluded
sensibly that the Fifth Amendment's drafters conceived of an eminent
22.
See infra Part VI. See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A
THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980).

23.

U.S. CONST. amend. V.

24.
See, e.g., ARiz. CONST. art. II, § 17; MINN. CONST. art. I, § 13; OHIO CONST. art. I, § 19;
S.C. CONST. art. I, § 13.
25.
See Pritchett, supra note 4, at 9-10 (discussing early American conceptions of eminent

domain).
26.

See, e.g., Haw. Hous. Auth. v Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 239-40 (1984).
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domain that would allow taking private property for useful public land roads are the classic example - but not for the personal desires or whims
of the king, as was sometimes the practice in England, or his future
American counterparts.27
Considering the limited governmental activities of the early republic, there was little need to parse the limits of the meaning of "public
use." Governments used eminent domain sparingly - land for an army
fort here, a post office there, a reservoir down the road. 28 But the nineteenth century rush to the western American frontier, combined with the
rise of industrial capitalism, generated a new idea - that governments
could use eminent domain to foster economic growth by transferring land
to selected persons in the private sector. While states gave businesses
such as water mills prime space along river rapids, 29 the federal government granted enormous stretches of land to railroad companies in order
to bring railways, and thus western civilization, to the supposedly untamed frontier. 30 With hindsight, of course, we in the twenty-first century view these land shifts with considerable skepticism. From the jaundiced public-choice view of government, nineteenth-century governments were susceptible, through corruption and other means, of being
swayed by corporate interests. The most outrageous example of nineteenth century perversion of government was the 1869 sale (later revoked, leading to a United States Supreme Court case) by the Illinois
legislature of the entire downtown Chicago waterfront to the Illinois
Central Railroad. 31 Today's libertarians argue that government is not
needed to foster economic growth; in fact, government will only get in
the way. 32 If specific parcels of land are valuable for economic growth,
private parties will beat down the doors of their owners in order to develop them. Even if government is not corrupt, there is no reason to
think that bureaucrats or legislatures are as good as private accountants
in figuring what which land purchases are potentially profitable, and thus
economically beneficial for the economy.
The nineteenth century examples established a precedent that there
are some circumstances in which the public welfare arguably may be
27. See Donald J. Kochan, "Public Use" and the Independent Judiciary: Condemnation in an
Interest-GroupPerspective,3 TEx. REV. L. & POL. 49, 65-71 (1998).
28. See McFarland, supra note 17, at 142-43, 146-47. See also Pritchett, supra note 4, at 713, for a history of nineteenth century interpretation of the limits of eminent domain.
29. See, e.g., Scudder v. Trenton Del. Falls Co., 1 N.J. Eq. 694, 728-30 (N.J. Ch. 1832).
30. See, e.g., Pritchett, supra note 4, at 9-12 (discussing the debates over the use of eminent
domain to assist railroads and other nineteenth century businesses).
31.
I11.Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 439-64 (1892). See generally Joseph D.
Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Origins of the American Public Trust Doctrine: What Really
Happened in Illinois Central, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 799 (2004) (presenting an extensive history of the
landmark litigation).
32. See, e.g., EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 177 (criticizing governmental intervention in private
transactions). See generally MILTON FRIEDMAN & ROSE FRIEDMAN, FREE TO CHOOSE: A PERSONAL

STATEMENT (1990) (statement of libertarianism).
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served by the government's transferring land from one private owner to
another. The current use of the land may be undesirable (for example, a
local polluter who meets federal and state laws and who can be forced to
move only through a government buy-out) or another land use might be
more desirable (for example, a ranch owned by an obstinate farmer that
sits on top of an especially large uranium mine in an age when nuclear
energy is considered essential).
The second half of the twentieth century witnessed a great expansion in the use of eminent domain to shape private development.33 Such
growth dovetailed with the greater vision for government that emerged in
the wake of the Great Depression, World War II, and post-war prosperity, when government seemed a solution for social ills. Professor
Wendell Pritchett has recently detailed the twentieth century growth of
the idea of "urban renewal. 3 4 At the beginning of the century, the idea
of slum "clearance" was touted as a progressive means of helping the
urban poor.35 Using eminent domain to get rid of run-down structures
led to the term "condemnation" as a catch-all for government's taking of
private property. In today's under-populated central cities of vacant
buildings and parking lots, it is hard to imagine that the overcrowding of
cramped urban tenements was considered an urgent need a century ago,
and that simply condemning these structures was considered by progressives to be a step toward bettering the lives of the urban poor, even if
demolition did not necessarily provide them better housing.36 A more
expansive conception of eminent domain, approved by deferential courts,
emboldened a variety of interests. Real estate developers, eager to take
advantage of the potential profits of development in central cities,
aligned themselves with the housing reformers.3 7 Big city mayors often
completed the chorus, as the prospect of a more affluent citizen base
seemed a worthy temptation. Spurred by these forces, state and local
authorities used eminent domain not only against "slums" but for areas
that were subject to "blight," a botanical term that defined an area that
38
seemed diseased and headed for slum conditions in the near future.
Once authorized to take property that fit rather loose definitions of
"blight," redevelopment authorities were able to condemn nearly at will.
In a classic example of the public-choice criticism of putatively public
See Pritchett, supra note 4, at 7-14.
33.
See generally Pritchett, supra note 4.
34.
35.
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, urban social reformers such as Jane
Addams focused public attention on the health and safety problems of urban overcrowding. See,
e.g., Harold L. Platt, Jane Addams and the Ward Boss Revisited: Class, Politics, and Public Health
in

Chicago,

1890-1930,

5

ENVTL.

HIST.

194

(2000),

available

at

http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi-qa3854/is-200004/ai-n8890369#continue.
See id.
36.
37. See Pritchett, supra note 4, at 2-6, 26-30.
38.
See id.at 14-34, 38-39 (discussing the abuse of the term across the twentieth century
from its origin as a means of slum clearance to its modern conception as a catch-all of governments
that seek to condemn land).
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welfare initiatives being a mask for private gain, these authorities seized
private property - often lower-income and African American neighborhoods - in cities across the country. Shielded by the banner of housing
reform, these seizures were spurred largely by the prospect of profit for
private developers who sought subsidized land.39 So scornful are many

commentators today of the once-lauded urban renewal projects of the
mid and late twentieth century that they are often referred to derisively as
"Negro removal. ' 4°
By the mid twentieth century, American courts came to accept the
governments' arguments for deference. 41 After all, courts early in the
century had acquiesced to government regulation of land use through
zoning (over the muffled complaints that zoning was a mask for social
and class segregation) because of the apparent public welfare benefits of
separating land uses.42 The same arguments convinced courts that local
governments, not judges, were in the best position to determine what was
truly in the public interest. The landmark United States Supreme Court
case was Berman v. Parker,which in 1954 upheld the taking of dozens
of blocks of residential land in southwest Washington, D.C. 43 (Ironically, the facts that most of the residents were black and that the redevelopment plans would price-out most poor black citizens were not issues in
the litigation, despite the fact that the case was argued shortly after the
school desegregation case of Brown v. Board of Education.44) The court
rejected the challengers' argument that, because the plan called for privately owned development, it failed the public-use requirement. Justice
William 0. Douglas, who had a soft spot for utopian ideas of land regulation, wrote that judges must defer to local government's expert findings
as to the harms caused by poor housing stock and the benefits to the
community of replacing them through condemnation. 45
If there were any doubt as to the breadth of the government's
power, it was dispelled in 1984 by Hawaii Housing Authority v. Mid39.
See generally Pritchett, supra note 4, at 22-35 (discussing the rise of abuse of eminent
domain under the banner of urban "renewal").
40.
Harris, Jr., supra note 4 at 12; Pritchett, supra note 4, at 47.
41.
See, e.g., Pritchett, supra note 4, at 37, 47 (discussing the rise of deference to eminent
domain decisions, culminating in Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954)).
42.
See Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 397 (1926) (rejecting a claim of
"right of property" and upholding the constitutionality of land use zoning restrictions under the
police power); see also Vill. of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 6 (1974) (holding a town may
regulate the composition of households under land use law); State ex rel. Stoyanoffv. Berkeley, 458
S.W.2d 305, 310, 312 (Mo. 1970) (upholding laws that restrict land use on aesthetic grounds).
43.
348 U.S. 26, 36 (1954).
44.
See Berman, 348 U.S. at 36 (1955); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954)
(holding that "separate but equal" schools were inherently unequal) af'd, Brown v. Board of Educ.,
349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) (holding that states are ordered to take "all deliberate speed" to desegregate)
45.
See Berman, 348 U.S. at 35-36 (holding that courts must defer to the judgment of the
political branches on social issues, including the exercise of eminent domain); see also Vill.
of Belle
Terre v.Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974) (Douglas, J.,writing for the court and approving a zoning law
that excluded group houses for college students).
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kiff46 The Hawaii government adopted legislation that provided for the
seizure of large parcels of the island chain from owners who had inherited them during Hawaii's near-feudal colonial history. After appropriate
compensation, the land was then sold to less affluent Hawaiians, mostly
tenant farmers who had already worked the land.47 After the Ninth Circuit held that the quasi-socialistic redistribution to private citizens failed
to meet the public-use requirement, the Supreme Court reversed. 48 The
reach of eminent domain is equivalent to the reach of the police power,
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor wrote for the Court, citing the famously
amorphous power of state and local authorities to do just about anything
they desire if it serves a putative public interest and violates no other
right. 49 As long as government provides compensation, therefore, it was
almost certain to fulfill its federal constitutional obligation.
Meanwhile, at the state level, the most notable - or notorious - case
was Michigan's 1981's Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit. 50 Faced with a threat by the General Motors Corporation to move
production out of the city, Detroit seized an entire neighborhood, Poletown, in order to provide the automaker with the land, and the price, that
it wanted.5 ' Poletown was not a predominantly black neighborhood (and
Detroit had a black mayor by this time), but it was nonetheless no match
for the persuasion of Detroit's most prominent employer. 2 Echoing the
federal constitutional law, Michigan's highest court held that it must
defer to the city's finding of what was good for Detroit.5 3 This finding
was sufficient to satisfy Michigan's public use requirement until 2004,
when it was overruled by County of Wayne v. Hathcock. 4 As explained
in Part V, Hathcock disallowed eminent domain destined for private
hands, except when there are "special concerns" with the old land use,
such as when the government seeks to remove a "blighted" land use - a
potentially 55large loophole that should continue to trouble property rights
advocates.

46. 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
47.
See Haw. Hous. Auth., 467 U.S. at 234. Within the case there is a discussion on Hawaii's
"land reform" program of exercising eminent domain to redistribute land. Id. at 232-34.
48. Haw. Hous. Auth., 467 U.S. at 245, rev'g, Midkiffv. Tom, 702 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1983).
49. Haw. Hous. Auth., 467 U.S. at 240 ("The 'public use' requirement is thus coterminous
with the scope of a sovereign's police powers").
50. 410 Mich. 616 (1981) (en bane).
51.
See Poletown Neighborhood Council, 410 Mich. at 636-37 (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting)
(recounting the history of the Poletown controversy); see generally JEANIE WYLIE, POLETOWN:
COMMUNITY BETRAYED (1989).
52.
See generallyJEANIE WYLIE, POLETOWN: COMMUNITY BETRAYED (1989).

53. Hathcock, 410 Mich. at 638-39.
54. 471 Mich. 445, 482-83, rev'g Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 410
Mich. 616 (1981).
55.
County of Wayne, 471 Mich. at 475-76.
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In contrast to Hathcock, the United States Supreme Court's 2005
decision in Kelo v. New London 56 did little to change the federal precedent. Had the Supreme Court tightened the federal constitutional law, it
would have restricted eminent domain at all levels of governments, by
virtue of the Fifth Amendment's application to the states.5 7 As it was,
the much-anticipated Kelo reinforced the deferential approach of the
federal courts and constituted a major disappointment to the property
rights movement.5 8 Time will tell whether it is only a temporary setback.
The eminent domain in Kelo was a good example of how local governments are using the power to try to shape their economies. The City
of New London, Connecticut, which was long famous for its submarine
yards and naval station, has suffered from the end of the Cold War; as of
the late 1990s its unemployment was double that of the state average. 59
Like many "old economy" cities, New London saw salvation in luring
new technology companies to its borders. 60 Soon after Pfizer Inc., a
pharmaceuticals firm, announced tentative plans in 1998 to locate a research facility in New London, an economic development corporation
established by the city submitted a plan for a multifaceted new development complex around the Pfizer site. 61 The ninety-acre development
plan, which was approved by the city in 2000, would include a "small
urban village" of shops and restaurants, marinas and a "riverwalk," new
residences, space for a naval museum, and room for plenty of offices.6 2
New London hoped to create 1000 new jobs, increase tax revenues, and
"revitalize" the city. 63 Most of the land was purchased by negotiation;
56.
125 S.Ct. 2655 (2005).
57. See Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 243-44 (1897) (finding the "takings" clause applies to state governments).
58.
See, e.g., Ken Hearny, High-CourtSeizure Decision Sparks Uprising,BALT. SUN, July 24,
2005, at 4L, availableat 2005 WLNR 11644508 (noting the nationwide negative political reaction to
Kelo, including the adoption of a resolution in the U.S. House of Representatives deploring the
decision); Shannon O'Boye, Politicians Trying to Ease Public's Fear of Governments Seizing Property, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, July 27, 2005, at BI, available at 2005 WLNR 11795323 (noting
legislative initiatives at both the federal and state levels to restrain local governments); Rosa Brooks,
It's Open Season on P~ivate Property,L.A. TIMES, July 28, 2005, available at 2005 WL 11848751
(criticizing Kelo).
Some liberal commentators have come to the defense of Kelo, albeit somewhat reluctantly. See, e.g., Editorial, Eminent Latitude, WASH. POST, June 24, 2005, at A30, available at 2005
WLNR 9994769 (concluding that a higher scrutiny of "public use" would be troublesome); Richard
Cohen, Take Life, but Not My House, WASH. POST, July 26, 2005, at A19, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/07/25/AR2005072501334.html
(syndicated column) (criticizing conservatives for caring more about government's taking of property
than of life).
59. See Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2658 (discussing the downturn in New London's economy); see
generally JOHN PINA CRAVEN, THE SILENT WAR (2001) (discussing New London and submarine
construction in the Cold War).
60. See Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2659 (referring to the town's hope that Pfizer and other "research
and development" businesses would rejuvenate the city).
61.
Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2659. It is interesting that the record did not show that the development plan was a prerequisite or even a "carrot" to Pfizer's building in New London.
62. Kelo,125 S. Ct. at 2659.
63. Id. at 2658.
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other parcels, including the homes of some of the eventual plaintiffs,
were targeted for eminent domain. 64 The properties were not "blighted;"
they were condemned because of the needs of the development plan.65
As with any modem American development,
some of the home parcels
66
might be used for automobile parking.
The majority opinion in Kelo - written by Justice Stevens and
joined by four other relatively liberal justices, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer - rejected the plaintiffs' request to narrow the Fifth
Amendment's public-use requirement. The majority assessed the precedent at the highest level of generality. In both Berman and Midkiff, the
Court had approved eminent domain projects in which some or all of the
land was destined for private ownership; both projects were intended to
help the localities' economies.6 7 Accordingly, the majority concluded,
the public-use restriction does not forbid taking land destined for private
hands; rather, the test remains simply whether the eminent domain serves
a "public purpose.', 68 Because courts must defer to the economic policy
judgments of local governments, 69 New London's eminent domain complied with the Fifth Amendment.70 While the Court emphasized that the
New London project did not benefit any particular private party, 7' this
observation skirted an important issue, which occurs in many other development cases. Many exercises of eminent domain plainly do benefit
an identifiable private party, which sometimes promises to build in the
city only if it receives discounted land.72 The Kelo majority dodged the
point that a benefit to a specific private party may often accompany a
purported public benefit. Deciding whether the private or public benefit
is the leading motivation, and which benefit is merely "incidental," remains a challenge for any more skeptical review under the Fifth
Amendment.

64.
See id.
65.
See id.at 2660.
66.
See id.at 2659.
67.
See id. at 2660-61 (discussing Berman and Midkiffl.
68. Kelo, 125 S.Ct. at 2661, 2663 (concluding that the "public use" requirement means only
that the project must serve a "public purpose").
69. Id.at 2668. The Court quickly dismissed the plaintiffs' alternative suggestion that courts
should permit eminent domain for economic development only when the court finds a "reasonable
certainty" that the purported public benefits would actually occur. See id. at 2667. Such a factbound inquirywould be a dead-end; courts cannot and should not engage successfully in such second-guessing of economic judgments. Id.
70.
See id.at 2665.
71.
Kelo, 125 S.Ct at 2661-62 (stating that the Hawaii law in Midkiffdid not benefit any class
of identifiable individuals). But the entire point of the Hawaii plan was to enable tenant farmers to
buy the land on which they worked; this specific class of individuals clearly gained, at the expense
of those landlords whose property was taken. This transfer may have served the public, but it cannot
be denied that it also helped a specifically identifiable persons.
72.
See, e.g., County of Wayne, 471 Mich. at 452, 453 (stating new economic development is
contingent upon the government's provision of land), overruling Poletown Neighborhood Council v.
City of Detroit, 410 Mich. 616 (describing how the corporation threatened to move the facility to
another city unless the government provided land).
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The five-justice majority in Kelo failed to make even a nod to the
leftist critique of eminent domain as tending to hurt lower-income residents. This may have been due in part to the advocacy of the plaintiffs
by attorneys for the Institute for Justice, a property rights organization,73
which appeared to offer only half-heartedly the liberal skepticism.7 4 It is
not hard to read between the lines of the majority opinion, however, a
trepidation over expanding property rights against the government. The
Court noted approvingly the "carefully formulated" redevelopment project in New London and the supposed benefits that the project would
bring to the city. 75 This focus on due process and community benefits
parallels the deferential approach employed by the more liberal justices
in cases asserting an unconstitutional "regulatory taking., 76 Indeed, the
only hopeful ground for future challenges noted by the majority appears
to be an assertion that the government is unfairly giving the land to only
one owner 77 or other evidence of "illegitimate 78
purpose" - presumably,
for example, the bribery of government officials.
Finally, in an ironic twist, Justice Stevens noted that the theme of
"federalism" and the "great respect" owed to state legislative and judicial
judgments counseled against having the federal courts strike down local
political choices. 79 If the citizens of Connecticut consider the benefits of
private ownership more important than the benefits of economic development, they are free to restrict eminent domain through either state constitutional or statutory law. The Court cited both Michigan's Hathcock8 °
and California's prerequisite of a finding of "blight" before eminent domain may be used 81 as examples of states giving some protections to
their landowners. Such protections, however, may not be very effective
in preventing eminent domain abuses, as I discuss in Part V.
73.
Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2658.
74. See generally Transcript of Record, Kelo v. New London, 125 S.Ct 2655 (2005), 2005
WL 529436.
75.
See Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2665.
76.
See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1040-41 (1992)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (relying on the similar factors in arguing for upholding a government's
prohibition of coastal land construction); Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York, 438 U.S. 104, 138
(1978) (upholding a city's historic landmark law that restricted the use of property, in large part
because of the due process afforded in the landmark designation process and the benefits provided to
the public).
77.
Kelo, 125 S.Ct. at 2666-67. In response to the argument that "without a bright-line rule
[against eminent domain for economic development] nothing would stop a city from transferring
citizen A's property to citizen B for the sole reason that citizen B will put the property to a more
productive use and they pay more taxes," the Court wrote that such an action, which would be
unlikely in an "integrated development plan," was "not presented in this case. While such an unusual exercise of government power would certainly raise a suspicion that a private purpose was
afoot, the hypothetical cases posited by petitioners can be confronted if an when they arise." Id.
78. See Kelo, 125 S.Ct. at 2661.
79.
See id.at 2664 (citing Hairston v. Danville & W. R.R., 208 U.S. 598, 606-07 (1908))
(differences among states my lead to differing approaches to land use and land use law).
80. See id.
at 2668 n.22 (citing County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765 (2004)).
81.
See id. at 2668 n.23 (citing Cal. Health & Safety Code Ann. §§ 33030-33037 (West
1997)).
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The Kelo dissent - penned by Justice O'Connor and joined by the
property rights-oriented Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and
Thomas - assessed the eminent domain precedent at a much lower level
of generality. The dissenters were faced with the particular difficulty of
the twenty-year-old precedent in Midkiff, written by Justice O'Connor,
which stated that the power of eminent domain was coterminous with the
expansive "police power" of local governments.82 Disassociating herself
from this "errant language," 8 3 Justice O'Connor in Kelo followed the
approach of the Michigan court in Hathcock by seeking to limit eminent
domain to those specific situations in which the high court had previously upheld the government's conduct.8 4 There are three such categories, Justice O'Connor wrote.8 5 The first is when the public retains ownership of the taken land; the second is when the land is transferred to a
common carrier, such as a private railroad or utility; the third, most
amorphously, is when eminent domain stops some "affirmative harm"
inflicted on society.86 Harms such as the "blight" in Berman and the
"oligarchy" in Midkiff are examples. 87 The property rights justices'
adoption of this final category is especially ironic, considering that the
four dissenting justices concluded, in a significant 1992 regulatory takings case, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,88 that it made no
sense to describe certain land uses as "harmful," as opposed to the government's merely gaining a benefit by requiring some other land use.89
Expediency once more ruled the day.
One fact that bothered the property rights justices is that unfettered
use of eminent domain may create a "specter of condemnation [that]
hangs over all property." 90 This may be true; but this specter has always
existed, in the form of condemnation for public ownership. Justice
O'Connor both alluded to the possibility of undue private influence "Nothing is to prevent the State from replacing any Motel 6 with a Ritz-

82.
See Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 240 ("The 'public use' requirement is coterminous with the scope
of a sovereign's police powers.").
83.
See Kelo, 125 S.Ct. at 2675 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The rationale for the "errant
language" reference was that the statement about "public use" being coterminous with the police
power was "unnecessary to the specific holdings of those decisions" - in other words, that it was
dictum. Two decades of law students would have to be re-educated.
84. See id.
at 2673 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
85.
See id.
86. See id.
at 2673-74 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
87.
See id.
88.
505 U.S. 1003 (1992). The Court in Lucas held that a regulation that deprives a landowner of all economically beneficial use of the land and that prevents the landowner from using the
land in a non-nuisance-creating manner triggers the payment of Fifth Amendment compensation for
the "total taking." See id.
at 1027-31.
89. See id.
at 1025 ("A given restraint will be seen as mitigating 'harm' to the adjacent parcels
or securing a 'benefit' for them, depending upon the observer's evaluation of the relative importance
of the use that the restraint favors."). Justice Scalia wrote the Lucas opinion and was joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor and Thomas.
90. See Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2676 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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Carlton, any home with a shopping mall, or any farm with a factory" 91 and rather perfunctorily cited the leftist criticism that "the beneficiaries
are likely to those citizens with disproportionate influence and power in
the political process, including large corporations and development
firms. 92 But one cannot help but think that what bothered the dissenters
even more was the quasi-economic fear that widespread eminent domain
will squelch private initiative - constitutional rights against unlawful
takings "ensure stable property ownership by providing safeguards
against excessive, unpredictable, or unfair use of the government's eminent domain power," O'Connor wrote93 - and, perhaps most of all, that
eminent domain offends the principle of close-to-inviolate private property rights. Justice O'Connor concluded by citing James Madison's
statement that "[T]hat alone is a just government, which impartially secures to very man, whatever is his own." 94 In sum, however, Kelo appears to have added little to the law or understanding of eminent domain
and how perceived abuses might be curbed.
Legal commentators of a variety of stripes have attacked the toothless public-use standard. Richard Epstein, a libertarian, has lamented
that business plans and productive economic activity may be disrupted
by the specter of eminent domain hanging over the heads of private
property. 95 Lee Anne Fennell, approaching the topic from the viewpoints
of economic efficiency and distribution, wrote that eminent domain often
fails to provide for truly "just" compensation, especially for values such
as autonomy. 96 Nicole Stelle Garnett has argued that targets suffer uncompensated psychological tolls, including "demoralization costs," of
being uprooted from their property. 97 Focusing on the fact that poor
neighborhoods are often the target of condemnation, Wendell Pritchett
has chastised the courts for their misguided "faith in the political system's ability to operate in a non-discriminatory manner." 98 Outside the
91.
Id. at 2676.
92.
Id. at 2677.
93.
Id. at 2672.
94.
Id. at 2677 (citing James Madison, Property,NAT'L GAZETTE (Mar. 29, 1792), reprinted
in 14 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 266 (R. Rutland et al., eds., 1983)).
95.
See EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 177 (criticizing governmental meddling in private transactions).
96.
See Lee Anne Fennell, Taking Eminent Domain Apart, 2004 MIcH. ST. L. REV. 957, 959
(2004). Professor Fennell argued that "the public use clause is meant to screen out takings for which
monetary compensation is not just." Id.at 1002. Among her proposals to rein in eminent domain
destined for private ownership is a system whereby those homeowners could give advance consent,
with a tax break, to eminent domain. See id. at 995-96. An earlier and influential economic analysis
of eminent domain and public use was Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72
CORNELL L. REV. 61 (1986).
97.
See Gamett, supra note 13, at 944, citing James G. Durham, Efficient Just Compensation
as a Limit on Eminent Domain, 69 MINN. L. REV. 1277, 1305-06 (1985) (discussing the economic
costs of dislocation); Frank Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundationsof "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1215-16 (1967) (arguing that
just compensation does not account for the "demoralization" caused to targets).
98.
See Pritchett, supra note 4, at 46.
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legal academy, activist David H. Harris, Jr. has pointed to eminent do99
main as a chief culprit in the loss of property by African Americans.
Historian James W. Ely, Jr. has relied on eighteenth century critics of
government in calling for00the courts to rein in the "despotic power" of
modem eminent domain.'
In the face of sharp criticism from so many angles, why has eminent
domain been so resistant to change for so long? The chief reason is that
eminent domain was carried along in the wide stream of judicial deference to economic regulation in the twentieth century. In nearly every
realm, courts have deferred to the policy judgments of governments and
their delegate agencies. 0 1 Indeed, the entire umbrella of what became
known as administrative law has incorporated deference, with limited
exceptions for claims involving special enumerated rights for certain
individuals, such as free speech and race discrimination.102 While courts
in the early twentieth century were often skeptical of permitting the nascent progressive movement to regulate private conduct - the so-called
Lochner era' 0 3 - land use was one of the first areas in which the courts
stopped their second-guessing and let local authorities use a free hand in
regulating private conduct. In the landmark 1926 zoning case, Village of
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Corp., 10 4 the Supreme Court, using what would
later be called "rational basis" review, deferred to the town's findings
that zoning served the public welfare. 0 5 With a few hiccups, courts at
both the federal and state level have followed Euclid and refused to second-guess the substantive wisdom of land use regulations, as long as the
government proffers some public welfare rationale. The Court has even
99. See generally Harris, supra note 4.
100. James W. Ely, Jr., Can the "Despotic Power" Be Tamed?, PROB. & PROP., Nov.-Dec.
2003, at 31, 32.
101.
See, e.g., Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 36 (2003) (courts should defer to policy judgments); Chem. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 470 U.S. 116, 138 (1985); Karcher v.
Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 740 (1983).
102. See, e.g., Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 865-66
(1984) (federal courts must defer to the legal interpretations of agencies, in large part because the
agencies are part of the political branches of government, which are more responsive to the public);
U. S. Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 22-23 (1977) ("As is customary in reviewing economic
and social regulation, . . . courts properly defer to legislative judgment as to the necessity and reasonableness of a particular measure."); State v. Barquet, 262 So. 2d 431, 437-38 (Fla. 1972) (courts
should defer to the legislature on social and moral issues).
103.
See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905) (holding the law limiting the hours that
a baker could work violated a "right to contract"); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and
the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1689, 1697, 1718 (1984) (criticizing the "Lochner era" as the
assertion by judges of one political choice - libertarianism - over other choices of government).
104. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
See id. at 387-97. How can we reconcile the deference provided in Euclid and the contin105.
ued strictness of the Supreme Court in reviewing other aspects of activist government until the late
1930s? Perhaps the answer is that zoning laws tended to provide benefits to the majority of affluent
citizens, whose homes were legally protected by zoning from the prospects of annoying businesses
or industry moving in down the street. See id. at 388, 394 (referring to apartments as "parasites" and
suggesting a "pig" doesn't belong in a "parlor"). By contrast, regulations regulating business conduct outside of land use, such as the employment regulations at issue in Lochner, tended to help less
affluent Americans at the expense of the capitalist class. See Lochner, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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given its imprimatur to laws that favor a particular character or lifestyle
06
for the locality - at least if the lifestyle is the single-family household.'
Only when government has violated procedural standards, such as regulating land on the aesthetic whims of government officials, have courts
been more scrutinizing. 107
Land use regulation is impermissible, of course, when it violates a
specific constitutional right, despite claims of a public purpose. Government cannot use land law to infringe the right of free speech (it cannot
prohibit homeowners from putting political signs on their houses 0 8) or
the right against racial discrimination (government could not explicitly
segregate races through zoning, even in the separate-but-equal era10 9).
Should courts hold that eminent domain's public-use requirement constitutes another right that overrides deference? There are a number of problems with taking such a step. First, although "public use" might be interpreted to prohibit taking property when it is destined for private hands,
the Fifth Amendment does not make clear, either through its text or its
history, that this is the appropriate interpretation. Moreover, most constitutional rights are enforced from the viewpoint of the citizen challenging
the government - we ask, for example, whether the person's right of free
speech has been restrained. With eminent domain, by contrast, most of
the proposals for a tighter standard tend to focus on the nature of the government's plans for the property, not on its effects on the private citizen.
From a challenger's point of view, there is little difference in effect between eminent domain for a county fire station, which is clearly constitutional, and a similar taking destined for a private office and shopping
development. Finally, as explained below, most theories accept as constitutional at least some uses of the power to condemn and then transfer
to private hands. It remains a challenge for law to develop a coherent
theory for limiting abuses of eminent domain.
106.
Perhaps the height of this deference was Viii. Belle Terre v. City of Boraas, 416 U.S. 1
(1974), in which the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a town's ordinance that was designed to keep
college students from renting group houses. A landlord and a group of students argued that such a
restriction violated various constitutional rights, including the right of association. In upholding the
ordinance, however, the U.S. Supreme Court held, in effect (Justice Douglas writing for the Court),
that if a town wanted to reserve its land for traditional families only, a court cannot interfere with
this substantive choice. Justice Douglas stated:
A quiet place where yards are wide, people few, and motor vehicles restricted are legitimate guidelines in a land-use project addressed to family needs ....
The police power is
not confined to elimination of filth, stench, and unhealthy places. It is ample to lay out
zones where family values, youth values, and the blessings of quiet seclusion and clean
air make the area a sanctuary for people.
Id. at 9.
107.
See, e.g., Anderson v. City of Issaquah, 851 P.2d 744 (1993) (city may not reject a land
use because of subjective aesthetic "feelings" of a government official).
108.
See, e.g., City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 45-48 (1994) (enforcing a First Amendment right).
109.
See, e.g., Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 304, 310 (1880) (holding unconstitutional a state law requiring all-white juries and holding that the 14th Amendment's equal protection
guarantee prescribed only race discrimination).
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II. TODAY'S EMINENT DOMAIN CONTROVERSIES
Eminent domain has been the target of a growing chorus of critics
in recent years. This criticism has been driven, in large part, by factual
developments. First, competition among governments has pushed them
to more actively manage their economies and to look for new ways to
attract businesses, jobs, and tax revenue. Moreover, local governments,
understanding that courts have deferred to nearly any exercise of eminent
domain, have decided to flex their power in new, and sometimes disturbing, directions. These changes have forced a reevaluation of the legal
doctrine.
Political science commentators in recent decades have burst the
bubble of the civic republican model, which viewed government as a
body of sober representatives who deliberate and regulate private conduct solely in order to serve the common public interest."
A more
skeptical perspective, the "public choice" school, argues that there is no
such thing as the "public interest," only initiatives that help one private
interest or the other."' Laws adopted ostensibly to help the public are in
reality the masked use of government to help one group at the expense of
others - be it business interests who are helped by regulation of their
competitors or outdoor enthusiasts aided by laws restricting private development in parklands." 2 From another perspective, political scientist
Paul Kantor has argued persuasively that many local governments are no
longer in charge of their destinies." 3 Stung by movement of wealth and
jobs to favored suburbs, many American cities have become desperate to
retain and attract businesses and tax bases. As localities vie for business,
governments become victims of a ruthless "market" in which the demand
- the number of competing localities - greatly exceeds the supply of attractive and job-creating companies.' 14 To lower the cost of doing business in their communities, cities are encouraged to take steps such as

110. See, e.g., Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justificationfor the BureaucraticState,
105 HARV. L. REv. 1512, 1514 (1992) (stating that under the "civic republican model," "government's primary responsibility is to enable the citizenry to deliberate about altering preferences and to
reach consensus on the common good.")
111.
See, e.g., William F. Shughar II & Laura Razzolini, Introduction: Public Choice in the
New Millennium, in THE ELGAR COMPANION TO PUBLIC CHOICE xxii (William F. Shughart II &
Laura Razzolini eds., 2001) (public choice rejects the notion of a "public interest"); JAMES
BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT 18 (1962) (discussing the role of
economic incentives in human behavior).
112.

See generally DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A

CRITICAL INTRODUCTION (1991) (discussing the philosophical stance of public choice and its application to many realms of American law).
113.
See generally KANTOR, supra note 15, at 172-73 (arguing that with the loss of wealth and
power, cities have become dependent on attracting industry and business).
114. See Charles Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956)
(arguing that competing state governments act as a "market" in which citizens may choose where to
live).
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lowering the cost of land
giving tax breaks, curbing regulations, and
5
domain."
eminent
of
use
creative
through
In recent years, governments have moved beyond using their powers merely to attract business. Localities also understand that attracting
wealthy residents is financially beneficial for the local budgets." 6 Not
only do wealthier citizens usually pay more in property taxes, they also
typically demand fewer government services - they tend to have fewer
children who need public schools, they tend to get involved with crime
less often, and they tend to need fewer government health services and
emergency assistance.' 17 As a result, today's local governments are encouraged not only to use eminent domain to shape the climate for business, but also to try to shape the composition of their citizenry. Encouraging wealthier citizens is, of course, nothing new for local governments.
Since the early days of zoning, localities have used their land use power
for "exclusionary zoning," which discourages the poor, through techniques such as restricting apartment construction and requiring that new
houses must sit on large, and thus expensive, lots. 1 8 Eminent domain
raises the stakes by giving government the disturbing ability to jettison
existing poorer citizens from the community. Accordingly, govern"blight"
ments have pushed to the limits their power to condemn through
9
designations, as well as other exercises of eminent domain."

In many areas of law, commentators have observed that governments compete for busi115.
ness, and are dissuaded from regulating business, in order to improve their budgets and local economies. See, e.g., William W. Buzbee, Recognizing the Regulatory Commons: A Theory of Regulatory
Gaps, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1 (2003); Peter P. Swire, The Race to Laxity and the Race to Undesirability:
Explaining Failures in Competition Among Jurisdictions in Environmental Law, 14 YALE L. &
POL'Y REV. 67, 91-94 (1996).
116.
Counsel for New London, Conn., the town whose eminent domain is challenged in the
Kelo case, was quoted as saying, "We need to get housing at the upper end, for people like the Pfizer
employees. They are the professionals, they are the ones with the expertise and the leadership qualities to remake the city - the young urban professionals who will invest in New London, put their
kids in school, and think of this as a place to stay for 20 or 30 years." Iver Peterson, As Land Goes to
Revitalization, There Go the Old Neighbors, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2005, at A25, available at 2005
WLNR 1273623.
117.
See, e.g., Paul Boudreaux, E Pluribus Unum Urbs: An Explorationof the PotentialBenefits of Metropolitan Government on Efforts to Assist Poor Persons, 5 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 471,
502-03 (1998) (discussing why poor persons are likely to impose greater demands on local governments).
118.
See Vill. of Euclid, 272 U.S. 365, 394 (1926) (an early and telling example of the aversion
to apartment zoning); South Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel, 67 N.J. 151,
174 (1975) (the ground-breaking decision, under New Jersey law, requiring that localities diverge
from their usual aversion to apartment zoning and provide a "fair share" of low-cost housing); see
also James E. McGuire, The Judiciary'sRole in Implementing the Mount Laurel Doctrine: Deference or Activism?, 23 SETON HALL. L. REv. 1276 (1993) (discussing the legislative response); Susan
Ellenberg, JudicialAcquiescence to Large Lot Zoning: Is It Time to Rethink the Trend?, 16 COLUM.
J. ENVTL. L. 183 (1991) (discussing the practice of large-lot zoning, which often is touted as a way
of slowing "growth," but in fact merely spreads it out along a more sprawling are and raises housing
prices).
119.
See, e.g., Pritchett, supra note 4, at 13-26 (discussing the abuse of the "blight" designation, especially as a means of pushing away undesirable residents).
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The notion of competition among local governments to attract citizens is also nothing new. In the 1950s, economist Charles Tiebout suggested that the extraordinary number of small local governments in the
United States, even in each metropolitan area, serves the purpose of providing a "market" for governments.1 20 A citizen who desires low taxes
can pick a low-tax, low-service town, while another citizen who prefers
more services - such as an extensive public library or mental-health
counseling - can choose another community. This market for governments, however, poses a dilemma for compassionate local governments
that seek to provide financial or other assistance for poorer persons, including the fostering of low-cost housing. 12 1 Assistance for the less affluent encourages them to migrate to the town; at the same time, the tax
burden pushes away more affluent persons. Local governments can thus
be trapped in a variant of the economic tale of the prisoner's dilemma:
Although many governments may desire to provide social services, they
are discouraged from doing so because of competition with their
neighbors.122 The only way out of this dilemma is for governments to try
to close off the market through more centralized government decisionmaking, such as through metropolitan-wide governments. 23 Absent this
solution, governments have an incentive to try to jettison poorer people
from their community. While such an idea might strike one as shocking
or callous, it is actually a logical extension of Tiebout's recognition of
local government lawmaking as a market. Spurred by competition from
neighbors, or at least the threat of competition, local governments are
encouraged to maximize their tax bases and to minimize the number of
poor residents in1 24their community by any available method, including
eminent domain.
There is ample evidence that localities across the nation are using
eminent domain to discourage poor residents and to encourage the affluent, either through attractive (and high-priced) housing stock or retail
facilities that both pay high taxes and attract an affluent clientele. This
120.
See Charles Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956).
Tiebout argued that allowing local government to craft their own laws is efficient, because it permits
in effect a market of governments, in which citizens, in theory, are able to pick and choose the type
of government and mix of services (or lack thereof, with the concomitant benefit of lower taxes)
they desire. See id. at 416-24.
121.
See, e.g., Boudreaux, supra note 117, at 503-04 (arguing that poor persons are less likely
to be able to shop for governments efficiently, and that governments compete to discourage poor
residents).
122.
See id. at 504, citing PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, EcoNoMics 50607 (10th ed. 1976) (discussing the mechanics of the "prisoner's dilemma").
123.
See generally Boudreaux, supra note 117, at 504-06.
124.
See, e.g., Peterson, supra note 116, at A25 (discussing city of New London's desire to
attract upper-income residents through eminent domain); Bill Varian & Kris Hundley, Hillsborough
Set to Woo Scripps Deal, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Dec. 2, 2004, at 1B, available at 2004 WL

12973563 (discussing state government's agreement to pay for some salaries of professional employees as part of a package to lure a new campus for the California-based Scripps Research Institute
to Florida).
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125
phenomenon cannot be revealed fully by reviewing legal decisions.
Many exercises of eminent domain never end up in reported court opinions. After all, one of the perceived problems of eminent domain is that
it is often used against the poor and politically unsophisticated, who are
often unable to mount a legal challenge. A better barometer is found
through news reports of how governments across the nation have been
using, or abusing, eminent domain. Here is a sampling from the years
2004 and 2005:

e In Newark, New Jersey, the city is planning an upscale redevelopment plan in the Mulberry Street area. Two-thousand condominiums
would make up the heart of the planned complex. The city is in the
midst of condemning thirteen acres as "blighted," including a mix of
small homes and businesses. The city business administrator was
quoted as justifying the plan by saying, "In the end, this thing
is go' 126
ing to be here for 70 to 80 years as a tax ratable to the city."
South of Newark, in Long Branch, New Jersey, on the Atlantic
coast, the town has used eminent domain to condemn the residences
of about 300 people, many of them black, for redevelopment projects. The president of the local chapter of the NAACP has complained that "to use eminent domain to move people out just to move
in other people with money - that's just not right. '' 127 Ironically,
New Jersey was an avatar of state constitutional law to encourage affordable housing; each locality
must actively provide for its "fair
28
housing.1
low-cost
of
share"
*

In Ardmore, Pennsylvania, the township has designated as
"blighted" much of the downtown business area, including an upscale
coffee shop and a sophisticated men's clothing store. The business
area would be remodeled into an "urban village" focused around a
commuter rail stop, which the town hopes will be able to win back
shoppers who have left for neighboring towns and their shopping
malls. Explaining the township's rationale, Bruce Katz, one of the
nation's leading commentators on urban policy, said, "[c]ities actually have very few tools at their fingertips to maintain their competitive edge. I think eminent domain is a critical tool for these
places." ' 129 Nearby Philadelphia's Society Hill, in which poor residents were jettisoned for a redevelopment project that started in the
*

125.

See Corey J. Wilk, The Struggle Over the Public Use Clause: Survey of Holdings and

Trends, 1986-2003, 39 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 251, 257-61 (2004) (discussing eminent domain
and public use decisions over the past 20 years).
126.
Jeffery C. Mays, Newark Residents in Limbo - $550 Million Redevelopment Stymies
Homeowners, THE STAR-LEDGER, Aug. 15, 2004, at 3 1, available at 2004 WLNR 18071799.
127.
See Joseph Picard, Community Urged to Build Housing, ASBURY PARK FREE PRESS, Feb.
16, 2004, at Al, availableat 2004 WLNR 16589647.
128.
See S. Burlington County NAACP v. Twp. of Mt. Laurel, 336 A.2d 713, 724 (N.J. Sup.
Ct. 1975).
129.
Matthew P. Blanchard, Ardmore Tailors the Concept of Blight, PHILA. INQUIRER, July 31,
2004, at A01, availableat 2004 WLNR 3691422.
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1950s, is cited as an early exemplar of eminent domain to foster government-engineered gentrification.130
* Across the Delaware River in Camden, New Jersey, the old suburb
of Philadelphia plans to demolish hundreds of old houses in various
locations to make way for shopping complexes and condominium
and townhouse developments. Remarkably, for a city whose population has fallen dramatically over the past fifty years, the government
claims that one reason for the use of eminent domain is to decrease
"density" in the area. Opponents of the condemnation assert that the
poor people in the community, most of whom are African American
or Latino, don't have the clout that the developers have. 131
* In New York City, Mayor Michael Bloomberg has proposed a "visionary plan" to keep businesses from moving to the suburbs by creating a giant new business center in Brooklyn, across from lower
Manhattan. The mayor's plan would create 5.4 million square feet of
office space and thousands of apartments, but would also involve
eminent domain to displace 131 families and nearly 100 businesses. 132 Meanwhile, in Manhattan, the city used eminent domain
to evict apartment owners near Times Square who refused to sell,
standing in the way of a new office building for the New 13York
Times.
3
A blight designation was upheld by the New York courts.
* Across the country in Martinez, California, northeast of San Francisco, the city is considering the use of eminent domain to remove
low-cost housing for redevelopment - a controversial approach that
the city has rejected before. Although California law makes it comparatively difficult to use eminent domain for redevelopment among other things the condemnation of housing must be accompanied by subsidies for low-cost housing construction - the practice
has
34
a long history in the state and is becoming more popular. 1
* In San Diego, California, a new baseball stadium for the Padres
stands as the anchor of a boom in downtown development, which has
come at the cost of the removal of a number of low-income citizens
and small businesses, many of them Latino, through eminent do135
main.

130.
See Stephan Salisbury, Society Hill Emerged Amid Tumultuous Times, PHILA. INQUIRER,
Mar. 17, 2004, at G13, availableat 2004 WLNR 3701679.
131.
See Erik Schwartz, Progress or discrimination?, COURIER-POST, Aug. 5, 2004, at 1B,
available at 2004 WLNR 16060884.
132.
Hugh Son, Downtown Upswing: City Council Approves Sweeping Redo, N.Y. DAILY
NEWS, July 18, 2004, at 47.
133.
See Gideon Kanner, Not Always So Fit to Print,NAT'L L. J., Oct. 30, 2002 at A2 1; Gideon
Kanner, Feeding 'Times', NAT'L L. J., Jan. 7, 2002 at A29.
134.
Liz Tascio, Redevelopment's Mixed Blessings Cities Use Agencies as Tools to Improve,
Profit, CONTRA COSTA TIMES, July 18, 2004, at A01, availableat 2004 WLNR 3323021.

135.
See Daniel B. Wood, San Diego Reinvents Itself - and Gentrifies, CHRISTIAN Scl.
MONITOR, Feb. 26, 2004, at 2, available at 2004 WLNR 1642415.
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* In North Miami, Florida, the city is using eminent domain to help
give a "face lift" to the working-class town, which holds a large Haitian population. A city attorney was quoted as saying that the project, which will involve the demolition of low-cost apartments and
the construction of "upscale" condos, was "social engineering" that
will greatly improve the city's tax base. "If this works," the attorney
said, "everyone associated with 36it will be able to take pride in a oncein-a-lifetime accomplishment."
* Nearby, in Riviera Beach, Florida, the town is planning an enormous redevelopment project that would remove more than 2,000
houses, many of them low-cost and owned by African Americans, to
allow private development of high-rise condos, large houses, and
shops. The mayor defends the plan by pointing to the plan's tax
benefits, which may pay for better roads and 37
new schools. "We will
1
said.
he
Beach,"
Riviera
in
poverty
eliminate
9 In Alabaster, Alabama, the town declared as "blighted" a handful
of houses that refused to sell to a developer that planned a 100-acre
shopping center just off Interstate 65. The eminent domain plan received nationwide attention after it was reported that Wal-Mart, the
whipping boy of suburban development,
was reported to be an an138
chor of the shopping center.

* In Lakewood, Ohio, outside Cleveland, the suburb started eminent
domain proceedings against dozens of houses, apartments, and small
businesses, in order to facilitate the construction of new condominiums and a high-end shopping mall. Defending the action, the mayor
said, "This is about Lakewood's future. Lakewood cannot survive
without a strengthened
tax base. Is it right to consider this a public
139
good? Absolutely?"'
e In Ohio's capital, Columbus, a film called "Flag Wars" documented the painful transformation of the city's Near East Side, recently occupied mostly by low-income African Americans, to "Olde
Towne," an area attractive to young urbanites, including many single-sex couples, some of whom want the low-income residents to
leave. While the town has not yet used eminent domain, the filmmakers documented instances in which the city government facilitated the transformation by steps such as bringing a prosecution
against a vocal low-income resident for an140unlawful "sign" concerning his African heritage outside his house.

136. See David Ovalle, City is Banking its Future on Massive Redevelopment, MIAMI HERALD,
at IB, availableat 2004 WLNR 6296749.
137. See Dennis Cauchon, Pushing the Limits of 'Public Use', USA TODAY, Apr. 1, 2004, at
03A, availableat 2004 WLNR 6257751.
138. See Patti Bond, Eminent Domain Issue in Alabaster, ATLANTA J. CONST., Oct. 21, 2003,
at IA.

139.
60 Minutes: Eminent Domain: Being Abused? (CBS television broadcast July 4, 2004).
140. See Ty Burr, Documentary on Gentrification Loses Sight of the Big Picture, BOSTON
GLOBE, Apr. 23, 2004, at C6, available at 2004 WLNR 3587487.
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9 In Washington, D.C., the city has declared "blighted" a sixteenacre area of the poor southeast part of the city, which includes small
businesses run by immigrants, in order to make way for a new shopping center, and plans to use eminent domain to build a new baseball
stadium.141
* Finally, across the country in Las Vegas, Nevada, the government
declared "blighted" and condemned a number of old commercial
businesses in the once-cozy downtown to pave the way for a new
parking garage to serve the casinos of downtown Fremont Street,
which, ironically, is trying to compete with the larger casinos42of the
Las Vegas Boulevard strip in America's fastest-growing city.'
III. GOOD AND BAD SCENARIOS FOR EMINENT DOMAIN
In this part, I explore some of the dilemmas that face proposals to
tighten eminent domain's public-use requirement. These dilemmas form
obstacles to reform for both property rights conservatives and advocates
for racial minorities and the poor. In order to flesh out these problems, I
conjure up a handful of stylized hypothetical scenarios, most of which
resemble some of the real examples of eminent domain that are filling
the pages of today's newspapers. These scenarios present arguably
"bad" uses of eminent domain and arguably "good" uses of eminent domain to foster economic development.
1. PlayingBall. Faced with a tough re-election campaign, a big-city
mayor lunches with the owner of an out-of-town baseball team that
has been losing money in its current home town. The owner asks that
the city provide the team with a parcel of land for the construction of
a new ballpark. The mayor mentions land that is currently occupied
by a few blocks of small houses, occupied mostly by low-income
families. "The people should pose no problem," the major says.
"We'll being willing to play ball, especially if you help me out in the
re-election campaign." Nods are exchanged. The city condemns the
neighborhood as "blighted," and the owner's143
businesses make contricampaign.
re-election
mayor's
the
to
butions
2. Offshore Threat. The chief executive officer of a large manufacturing company is faced with declining sales in the face of stiff competition from foreign competitors. The CEO leaks to the press that
141.
See Tom Knott, Eminent Domain Threatens American Dream, WASH. TIMES (D.C.), May
20, 2004, at B02, availableat 2004 WLNR 771498.
142.
See Vin Suprynowicz, "The Taking... is Unconstitutionaland Void," LAS VEGAS REV.
J., Sept. 14, 2003, at 2E.
143.
Although cases of proven bribery are rare, the most infamous case of government yielding
to powerful and connected private interests in land matters was the sale of much of the Chicago
waterfront to the Illinois Central railroad in 1869. For a history of the politics of the sale, the possible corruption, and subsequent litigation under the public trust doctrine, see Kearny & Merrill, supra
note 31, at 924-30. For the story of a city's failed attempt to redevelop through construction of a
baseball stadium, see What Went Wrong?, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Mar. 9, 2005 (special section),

http://www.sptimes.com/2005/webspecials05/devilrays 10/index.shtml.
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she will consider moving production "offshore" unless the company
can expand at its current location and incorporate a new hi-tech
manufacturing process. The state government fears the loss of jobs
associated with the plant. The CEO then announces a deadline of
three months for the state to sell, for a nominal price, a 100-acre
piece of property needed for the factory expansion. The 100 acres
include an aging strip mall and a few old apartment buildings. Urged
on by labor union leaders, the state government uses eminent domain
to take the 100 acres. The land is transferred to the manufacturer at a
well-attended media144event, behind a banner "Saving Jobs, Building
Our Communities."
3. Halting "Decay." An older suburb just east of a big city includes
in its housing stock a large number of small "starter" houses and garden apartments built when the area attracted an influx of workers
during World War II. While nearly all of the early residents were
young white families, in recent years most white families have preferred the suburbs to the west, which contain newer, larger houses
with two-car garages. In their place, the older suburb has experienced an influx of immigrants, most of whom are Latino or African.
As a result of the demographic shift, the large chain stores leave and
are replaced by small thrift stores and carry-outs. Long-time residents in the old suburb campaign against the "decay" and eventually
join forces with a national shopping mall developer, which unveils a
plan to level the old shopping street and replace it with a gleaming
new upscale mall - 14if5 the county government agrees to take the land
by eminent domain.
Each of the three scenarios above might be considered "bad" exercises of eminent domain. In each, undue influence, economic pressure,
or racial and class bias has motivated the exercise of eminent domain.
Each might also raise potent objections under a tougher public-use requirement. Now consider some other, perhaps "better" uses of eminent
domain:
4. The City Park. A growing city finds that a drawback in its original layout is the lack of a downtown park. When an old hotel in the
city center is damaged by fire, the local government decides to exercise eminent domain and condemn the building. The city transforms
the block into a central city square. To help pay for its maintenance,
the city enters into long-term leases in the park with a popular coffee
144.
The most famous example of a powerful employer's using its economic clout to influence
local government's eminent domain was General Motors' successful effort to get Detroit to condemn
Poletown in the late 1970s. See Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d
455, 459-60 (Mich. 1981), overruled by County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765, 770
(Mich. 2004). Ralph Nader and Alan Hirsch have characterized the struggle between General Motors and the Poletown residents "like a football game between Penn State and a junior college."
Nader & Hirsch, supra note 13, at 226-27.
145.
Consider the example of Silver Spring, Md., the town where the author grew up, and
whose downtown was transformed in the early 2000s as part of a "revitalization" of the old suburb.
See Paul Boudreaux, The New Silver Spring Isn't Golden to Me, WASH. POST, Oct. 5, 2003, at B08.
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bar chain, a gourmet sandwich shop, and a privately run underground
parking garage. 146
5. Building Avenues. Another rapidly growing city is troubled by the
fact that its downtown streets were laid out in the nineteenth century,
before automobiles, and are too narrow and crooked for today's
heavy commuter traffic flows from suburban residential areas. Because of the congestion, many leading city businesses are moving to
distant suburbs - a phenomenon that brings with it all the environmental, land use, social, and excessive fuel use problems of "sprawl."
In an effort to curb the sprawl and encourage businesses to stay
downtown, the city and adjacent county join in a plan to take by eminent domain dozens of private lots along four routes into downtown.
The plan is to tear down most of the old structures along these routes,
lay out wider avenues to the downtown (with room for a light-rail
system) and then re-sell the remaining land along the new arteries,
giving priority to those owners whose property would be taken. New
construction along the routes would be147undertaken with the assistance of a set of leading urban architects.
6. Widget Town. A group of economists conclude that a particular
region's resilient economy has long been bolstered by its reputation
as a center for the widget industry. Without this special reputation,
the economists conclude, the region's economy would be likely to
decline, as many other old industrial areas have done. When the
XYZ Widget Corporation, the region's largest, is offered lucrative
tax breaks by other cities, XYZ announces that it will take one of the
offers unless it gets financial incentives from its home state. The
state legislature decides to condemn by eminent domain some valuable riverside land adjacent to the airport, which had been set aside
for a planned park, and instead to build the park on the other side of
the river. The state then sells the condemned land at a discount to
widget plant and not
XYZ, in return for a commitment to build a new148
to move from the region for another thirty years.
7. Revitalization Complex. Another industrial city has not been so
lucky. Like many others, it has witnessed a drain of its middle-class
families to the suburbs, while high crime discourages others from
moving in. As the city's tax base dwindled, its schools and services
suffered. Although many city blocks lay vacant, no one has wanted
146.
Pioneer Courthouse Square, the central square in Portland, Ore., which serves as the focal
point for the nation's most famously new-urbanist downtown, was opened by the city only in 1984,
after being a hotel and parking lot for most of its history. See, e.g., Pioneer Courthouse Square
History, http://www.pioneercourthousesquare.org/history.htm (last visited Sept. 22, 2005).
147.
The modem conception of Paris, France, as being a city of wide boulevards, broad vistas,
and elegant architecture dates largely from the mid 19th century, when Napoleon III's prefect of the
city, Baron Haussmann, condemned huge swaths of the city for his grandiose boulevards. See generally DAVID P. JORDAN, TRANSFORMING PARIS: THE LIFE AND LABORS OF BARON HAUSSMANN

(1995).
148.
Another way of looking at the Poletown matter is to see the city of Detroit wisely using
eminent domain to retain the most distinctive and salient aspect of its economy - as the nation's
automotive center.
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to risk new housing construction. Finally, a housing developer proposes to build a large mixed-use complex of stores and condominiums, along with a couple hundred low-cost apartments. To be successful, the developer states, the complex has to be big enough to
provide a sense of security, and has to be close enough to the downtown to attract single professionals. To fit the complex in, the developer plans to buy a number of vacant lots, but also needs the city to
condemn two blocks of occupied properties. The blocks currently
are home to a handful of old row houses, some of whose owners refuse to sell. Persuaded by the prospect of finally finding a private
housing developer that will venture into the city, and by the prospect
that success might attract more developments, the city declares the
block "blighted," condemns it, and sells it for a nominal fee to the

private developer. 149
8. Playing Ball, Revised When the original ballpark plan in scenario 1 falls apart because of a lack of sufficient parking and access
to highways, the newly elected mayor picks a section of downtown
near the interchange of two major freeways and close to existing
downtown parking lots that are usually empty in the evenings. An
independent engineering study concludes that the new location is the
best in the city for a new ballpark. Most of the property is occupied
by warehouses, many of which are abandoned or derelict. When the
engineering study is released, however, three warehouse owners demand a price far higher than the fairly generous government offers.
The city then exercises eminent domain to take the warehouse properties for fair market value to enable completion of the ballpark pro50
ject.
Scenarios 4-8 set forth examples that might be considered more justifiable exercises of eminent domain. One might consider some or all (or
perhaps none) of scenarios 4-8 to be both worthwhile and fair. One
could argue that in each of these cases the govermnent has "used" the
property to serve the public interest. In scenario 8, in particular, eminent
domain might be justified because private property owners are encouraged to "hold out" when their property is fairly unique in fulfilling a public housing need. Yet in all of these examples a private party has also
benefited unusually from the taking. In all of the examples except one,
private owners would take the title to the land. And even in scenario 4,
where the government has retained ownership of the "city park," the
149.
In Kelo v.City of New London, the town condemned land in order to encourage wealthier
residents, not poorer ones, of course. See Peterson, supra note 116, at A25. In some jurisdictions,
however, any new development project must include a share of low-cost housing, in order to alleviate the affordable housing crunch. See Brian W. Ohm & Robert J. Sitkowski, IntegratingNew Urbanism andAffordable Housing Tools, 36 URB. LAW. 857, 858 (2004).
150. Washington, D.C., plans to build a new ballpark, in part through eminent domain, for the
new privately owned Washington Nationals baseball team. See Dana Hedgpeth, Supreme Court
Case Could Affect Baseball Stadium, WASH. POST, Feb. 23, 2005, at E01. Although the plan is to
keep the property in public ownership, the primary use of and profits from the property would be for
the private owners. See id.
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government has transferred some of the land to private hands through
long-term leaseholds.
If a critic of excessive eminent domain accepts the idea that nongovernmental use of condemned property may sometimes be justified,
then the critic must develop a test to separate permissible uses of eminent
domain from impermissible ones. The most straightforward and restrictive test would be to limit eminent domain only to those cases in which
the government retained the fee simple. Such a rule would be a very
strict interpretation of the public-use standard. It would allow governments to take land for roads, schools, and fire stations, but not to engage
in any development projects in which the land is sold to private interests.
Even this seemingly blanket rule might, of course, cause difficulties.
What if a governmental authority tried to evade the rule by keeping the
fee simple but then entering into a ninety nine-year lease with a private
business? If the rule prohibited the leasing of taken land, would this
prohibit the government from renting out a corner of a passport office
building to a private photo shop, or from leasing out space to a sandwich
shop in the county office center? Would the government be prohibited
from selling the property forever, even when it decided that the fire station or post office should be moved elsewhere?
If law allows eminent domain in at least some cases in which the
government transfers the property to private owners, but not others,
complications arise in developing a more nuanced rule. Cases of proven
outright bribery probably should not be permitted; the prohibition might
be extended to cases of improper governmental behavior or bias, as in
the first "playing ball" example, scenario 1, above. But such bias is
likely to be difficult to prove. An even thornier problem arises in sorting
through development projects that are touted as serving the public interest. Compare the examples of "halting decay," scenario 3, with "widget
town," scenario 6. In the former example, the government's argument
that eminent domain serves the public welfare is tainted with racism, or
at least classism. What some affluent residents may view as the "decay"
of a town may appear to other, less affluent persons as merely an evolution in the town's character in a more diverse America. Accepting that
racial motivation is impermissible, how is a court supposed to make such
a factual finding with exercises of eminent domain? It is true that judges
and juries often make difficult decisions about whether race forms a partial or hidden motivation, in employment and other cases."' But the
well-known difficulties of such inquiries would be magnified in situations involving animus not against particular individuals, but against an
community. Moreover, in such cases it is not clear whether "disparate
151.
See, e.g., Pamela S. Karlan & Daryl J. Levinson, Why Voting Is Different, 84 CAL. L. REV.
1201, 1215 (1996) (discussing the complexities of discerning racial motivation in legislative decisions); Personnel Admin. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273-74 (1979) (setting forth a standard for
claims of racial motivation under the Fourteenth Amendment).
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impact" would be sufficient - that is, could a plaintiff make out a prima
facie case simply by showing that the eminent domain disproportionately
hurt members of racial minorities? 152 And how would the law handle a
town's "justification" that it undertook the redevelopment action for
purely financial reasons - that it needed more upscale development in
order to attract
tax revenue in order to pay for schools, police, and social
153
services?
In cases not involving race, the job for the courts becomes even
tougher. When a government argues that it needs eminent domain to
foster economic development, some may applaud the step. Others may
scoff, especially when one or more private businesses end up owning
much or all of the land. Critics may assert that it is private gain, not public welfare, that has spurred the project. 154 How is a court supposed to
resolve such a dispute? One stumbling block is ascertaining whether the
locality is being honest about its true motivations. Should a court try to
figure out, as in scenario 7, the "revitalization complex" example,
whether the government's assertions of a public benefit are valid, or a
ruse for private enrichment? Perhaps an even tougher task would be to
revaluate the government's judgment that a project would be financially
beneficial for the locality. In scenario 6, "building avenues," would the
supposed public benefits of building new routes and constructing new
buildings be worth the condemnation of dozens of properties? The answer seems murky. Because of the obvious pitfalls in having courts second-guess the judgments of elected officials or their delegated agencies,
courts in the twentieth century essentially washed their hands of such
types of decisions. 55 Exercises of the local police power generally are
given only cursory review, 156 while the Fourteenth Amendment's "rational basis" test employs a similar standard of deference. 5 7 Indeed,
152. The doctrine that a practice may violate anti-discrimination laws, without proof of discriminatory intent, if it exhibits "disparate impact" on suspect classes, was established in the employment discrimination case of Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,430-32 (1971). Disparate
impact was made an explicit requirement with the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. 102-166,
§§106, 107, 105 Stat. 1074, 1074-1076 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(k) (2004)).
153. A defendant may successfully defend a claim of disparate impact by showing that the
challenged policy or practice is justified as a nondiscriminatory "business necessity." See Griggs,
401 U.S. at 430-32.
154. In Kelo v. New London, argued before the Supreme Court on Feb. 22, 2005, the plaintiffs
argued the government should not be permitted to take property by eminent domain for the purpose
merely of fostering private economic development. See Brief for Petitioners at 12, Kelo v. New
London, No. 04-108 (U.S. Dec. 3, 2004).
155. See, e.g., Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 36 (2003) (courts should defer to policy judgments); Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. Natural Res. Defense Council, Inc., 470 U.S. 116, 138 (1985);
Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 740 (1983); see also Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483,
487 (1955) (refusing to second-guess legislative motivations).
156. See, e.g., Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 243-44 (1984) (courts will not
review the underlying merits of the police power decision); Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,
272 U.S. 365, 394 (1926) (deferring to town's decision to impose zoning restrictions).
157. Unless the claimant is in a suspect class, a governmental discrimination does not violate
the equal protection guarantee as long as there is a "rational basis" for the discrimination, tied to a
legitimate governmental end. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 442,
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even when a regulation is fairly obviously spurred by a desire to foster
one business at the expense of another, courts have deferred, as long as
the government sets forth an argument of public benefit. 158 If law is to
impose a tougher standard for eminent domain, therefore, it must go beyond the traditional law of deference and answer the hard questions.
IV. QUANDARIES FOR THE RIGHT AND LEFT

Constructing a tighter law of eminent domain is bound to conflict
with some established legal assumptions. It is also bound to clash with
some of the principled stances of both property rights conservatives and
advocates for the poor. Critics from both the right and left may find that
development of a new eminent domain standard will entangle them in
some thorny legal quandaries that will complicate any reform.
A. The Right
Property rights libertarians such as Richard Epstein were among the
first to deplore the supposed excesses of the late twentieth century law of
eminent domain.159 The first quandary facing a property rights-oriented
approach to reform, however, is the matter of compensation. After all,
private property owners are always entitled to "just compensation" when
their property is taken by eminent domain.160 Most of the legal battles
over the property clause of the Fifth Amendment in recent decades have
concerned whether government regulation, causing a diminution in the
value of the land, constitutes a "taking" for which the owner is then entitled to compensation.' 6' The goal of vigorous property rights advocates
in the courts, including Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justice
Antonin Scalia, has been a wider obligation of governments to compensate property owners. When faced with challenges to land regulations
that social conservatives view with skepticism - such as ecologically448 (1985) (zoning case); Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955); Reid v. Rolling
Fork Pub. Util. Dist., 979 F.2d 1084, 1087 (5th Cir. 1992) (land use case).
158.
In Williamson, it appeared that the legislature had protected professional optometrists and
ophthalmologists at the expense of opticians by making it illegal for the latter to fit old glasses into
new frames. See 120 F. Supp. 128, 134, 137 (D. Okla. 1954), rev'd, 348 U.S. 483 (1955). The
Supreme Court, however, held that it is not the role of the courts to second-guess such policy
choices. 348 U.S. at 487-88. If there is any evidence that a classification serves some legitimate
end it will be upheld, even in the face of considerable evidence that the classification was adopted at
least in part as protectionism for one group over another. See Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery
Co., 449 U.S. 456, 469-70 (1981), rev'g, 289 N.W.2d 79 (Minn. 1979).
159.
See generally EPSTEIN, supra note 1.
160.
E.g., U.S. CONST. amend. V (entitlement of "just compensation" when government takes
property for public use).
161.
See, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992) (state must compensate a landowner when a regulation eliminates all economically beneficial use of the land); Nollan v.
Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987) (a government cannot obtain an easement to serve
some legitimate governmental purpose, without payment of compensation); id. at 842 ("[I]f [the
government] wants an easement across the Nollans' property, it must pay for it"); Penn. Central
Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 147 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing it is
unfair for government to regulate land use so that a few regulated landowners bear all of the financial burden of providing a benefit to the community).
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driven limits on coastal construction 162 or laws barring the modification
of old buildings 163 - the front line of attack been to demand compensation, not to attempt the highly difficult task of second-guessing the public-welfare decision on its merits. As Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote in a
famous dissent, a property rights concern is that government should not
force individual landowners to sacrifice the value of their land for the
public4 good; instead, the government should compensate these landown16
ers.
In eminent domain cases, however, government has already conceded that it must pay just compensation (even if the fair market value of
the property, which is the usual standard for assessing compensation,
does not always fully compensate a landowner for the psychological or
sentimental losses sometimes generated with eminent domain). 165 It is
true, of course, that the public-use requirement is a separate constitutional requirement from the no-taking-without-compensation command.
Nonetheless, it would require a change in property rights philosophy to
support a tighter public-use test. Instead of focusing on the plain facts of
the monetary loss accompanying regulation, property rights advocates
will have to focus instead on the 66
vaguer psychological and social losses
1
domain.
eminent
with
associated
Indeed, a move away from compensation as the appropriate remedy
under the Fifth Amendment raises an even broader quandary for freemarket critics - a quandary of the fungibility of property. One of the
bases of free-market economics is the idea that the true "worth" of an
asset is best expressed through its monetary value in the market. 167 Distortions in the market are therefore considered to be "inefficient," in that
they decrease the overall wealth of society. 168 For a marketable asset
such as land, its value is best expressed by its fair market value. For
goods of equal value, rational consumers are presumed to be "indiffer162.
See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1028-29 (1992) (holding that the
government must compensate the landowner for the "total taking" regulation, if regulation did not fit
within traditional nuisance regulation).
163.
Penn. Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 138-39 (1978) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting) (arguing that government should have to compensate the landowner for the decreased
value of property as a result of historic preservation law).
164. Id.at 141 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
165.
See, e.g., Garnett, supranote 13, at 945 (discussing the psychological costs of losing one's
property by eminent domain); Fennell, supra note 96, at (describing the costs of a loss of "autonomy").
166.
This is not to say that property rights conservatives fail to contend that property owners
suffer financial loss through eminent domain. Epstein, for example, bases his objections largely on
the cloud over profitable investment and development caused by the potential of eminent domain.
See EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 177-81.

167.
See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1017 ("[Flor what is the land but the profits thereofi?]" (quoting I
E. COKE, INSTITUTES § 1, at (1st Am. ed. 1812))); see also DANIEL A. FARBER, ECO-PRAGMATISM:
MAKING SENSIBLE ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONS IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD (1999) (discussing the
economic efficiency model of human behavior).
168. See, e.g., Richard Epstein, The Proper Scope of the Commerce Power, 73 VA. L. REV.
1387, 1451-53 (1987) (touting the efficiency of the market and criticizing governmental meddling).
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ent" among them.' 69 To compensate property owners with the fair market value of their land - a requirement of eminent domain - is thus to
make them whole. Assuming the relative fungibility of an asset such as
land, an owner whose property is taken by eminent domain should be
able to replace it relatively easily with the compensation award, according to free-market economics.
This is not to say that the psychological and social losses associated
are not real costs, of course, to those whose property is taken by eminent
domain. 70 Nonetheless, these costs might justify only a modification of
the amount of compensation in order to make the owner whole, just as
awards for psychic injuries supposedly make tort plaintiffs whole. There
is no principle of "immorality" for violating "rights" in free-market economics. Epstein, accordingly has focused not on the psychic harms
caused by eminent domain but by the more subtle and indirect financial
injuries supposedly imposed on business plans by the uncertain specter
of eminent domain.17 ' It remains a challenge for private-rights jurists to
transform these ideas into workable standards for a tighter law of eminent domain.
B. The Left
Critics on the left face an ever greater array of quandaries. Both a
demand for a stronger right to retain private property (albeit in the name
of less-affluent property owners) and a call for a greater skepticism of the
government's exercise of its police power run counter to the major
thrusts of modem left-of-center property thought.
First, a limit on government's ability to exercise eminent domain
would almost necessarily implicate an expansion of a "right" to private
property, however defined. Yet modem left-of-center conceptions of
property almost uniformly de-emphasize the private, proprietarial nature
of property. As put by Professor Eric T. Freyfogle in his recent book,
The Land We Share, for example, "[p]rivate land in the law is an abstract
human construct" and "private property . . .is a social institution in
which public and private are necessarily joined.' ' 7 2 Citing Benjamin
Franklin's thinking that property is merely a creature of the legal system
and Thomas Jefferson's idea that government should "break up large

169.
See, e.g., 2 Paul A. Samuelson, Commentary on Welfare Economics, in THE COLLECTED
SCIENTIFIC PAPERS OF PAUL A. SAMUELSON 1041 (Joseph E. Stiglitz ed., 1966) (discussing the

concept of consumer "indifference").
170.
See Gamett, supra note 13, at 944, (citing James G. Durham, Efficient Just Compensation
as a Limit on Eminent Domain, 69 Minn. L. Rev. 1277, 1305-06 (1985) (discussing the economic
costs of dislocation)).
171.
172.

See EPSTEIN, supra note 1,at 177-81.
ERIc T. FREYFOGLE, THE LAND WE SHARE 2, 7 (2003).
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landholdings," Freyfogle argued that ownership of property
requires, as a
73
predominant feature, an obligation to the public interest.1
Indeed, left-of-center property theory emphasizes the authority of
government to thoroughly insinuate the public interest in private property. It rejects the notion that private property is a "bundle" of private
rights, removal of one of which triggers compensation. 74 Liberal commentators objected to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council that government cannot regulate
175
to deprive an owner of all economically beneficial use for the property.
And they reject the skepticism of government expressed in the Supreme
Court's stringent standard of review of "exactions" from landowners
seeking permits. 176 Liberal property theory calls instead for a sweeping
deference to governmental decisions to regulate private property. 1 " Environmentalists argue that pervasive regulations of air, water, and soil
use are justified by the historically under-appreciated interconnections
among these natural resources. 78 Liberal economic policy has emphasized the positive role that government can play in restricting, shaping,
and directing economic activity in certain positive directions. 79 A broad
power of eminent domain to foster urban redevelopment would seem,
therefore, to harmonize with this faith in government to mold economic
activity for the public benefit.' 80
A more skeptical standard for eminent domain would seem to align
leftist thought with the public-choice school of politics, usually associated with the political right. The public-choice theorists scoff at the
1 81
progressive notions of government's acting in the "public interest.,
173.
174.

Id. at5.
See, e.g., Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n., 483 U.S. 825, 831 (1987) (likening the owner-

ship of property to a "bundle of rights").
175.
See, e.g., Oliver A. Houck, More Unfinished Stories: Lucas, Atlanta Coalition, and
Palla/Sweet Home, 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 331, 334-68 (2004); Joseph L. Sax, PropertyRights and
the Economy of Nature: UnderstandingLucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 45 STAN. L. REV.
1433, 1438 (1993).
176.
See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837 (describing land use exactions as having an essential nexus to
the supposed harm for which they compensate); see also Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 398
(1994) (stating that the exaction must be roughly proportional to the supposed harm).
177.
See, e.g., Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1039 (Blackmun J., dissenting) (calling for deference to
governments land use policy judgments).
178.
Perhaps the most famous aphorism of environmentalists is John Muir's "[w]hen we try to
pick out anything by itself, we find it hitched to everything else in the universe." JOHN MUIR, MY
FIRST SUMMER IN THE SIERRA 110 (1908); see also Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1035 (1992) (Kennedy, J.,

concurring) (discussing the fragility and interconnection of ecosystems).
179.
See, e.g., Minor Myers III, A Redistributive Role for Local Government, 36 URB. LAW.
753, 776 (2004) (discussing the role of Democratic politics, beginning with the New Deal, in giving
government a larger role n the nation's economy).
180.
See, e.g., Brief for Law Professors Robert H. Freilich, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondents, Kelo v. New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005) No. 04-108, 2005 WL 176672 (arguing
for deference).
181.
See, e.g., William F. Shughart II & Laura Razzolini, Introduction: Public choice in the
New Millennium, in THE ELGAR COMPANION TO PUBLIC CHOICE, at xxii (William F. Shughart 11&
Laura Razzolini eds., 2001) (asserting that public choice rejects the notion of a "public interest");
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Such a concept is an illusion, they contend; most governmental decisions
merely serve one private interest group over another.' 82 Regulations that
purport to protect the environment for example, such as the restrictions
on coastal construction in Lucas, are not manifestations of the public
interest but merely a temporary political victory of those who enjoy recreation on undeveloped beaches over those who would seek to profit
from beachfront houses. 183 To develop a skeptical law of eminent domain would be to reverse the traditional leftist trust of government to
regulate social matters and to ally itself, however marginally, with the
public-choice school and the skeptics of the whole notion of the "public
welfare."
In sum, a tougher public-use standard would create an extraordinary
tension with left-of-center property theory. It would seem difficult for a
coherent conception of property law to both (1) follow a deferential
standard toward the regulation of private property, with no requirement
of compensation, and at the same time (2) impose a demanding standard
of inquiry into government's exercise of eminent domain, which comes
with compensation.
V. ASSESSING IDEAS FOR A TOUGHER PUBLIC-USE STANDARD

Most existing proposals for a tighter law of eminent domain fit into
three categories. 184 First, eminent domain could be allowed only when
the government retains the fee simple ownership of the taken property. I
call this the governmental title approach. Second, the power to condemn
could be permissible only when there are special and specified attributes
of the property that justify eminent domain. Such a test, adopted by the
Michigan Supreme Court in 2004 in Hathcock,185 may be called the specialcircumstances approach. Third, courts could construct a more exacting scrutiny of the public-welfare justifications for taking property destined for private ownership. This is the closer scrutiny approach.
The governmental title approach holds the benefit of simplicity.
Drawing on the Fifth Amendment's language of "public use," courts
could hold that governments cannot condemn land and then transfer it to
private parties. Eminent domain for roads, police stations, and fire stations would still be permissible, but condemnation for economic develBUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 111, at 18 (discussing the role of economic incentives in human
behavior).
182.

See generally Frank B. Cross, The Judiciary and Public Choice, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 355

(1999).
183.

See generally DAVID LUCAS, LUCAS VS. THE GREEN MACHINE (1995) (describing the

developer's point of view of how he battled what he saw as the overly powerful forces of environmentalism).
184.
This list is not exclusive. For another of the growing number of articles criticizing the
20th century deferential law of eminent domain, see Nancy Kubasek Time to Return to a Higher
Standard ofScrutiny in Defining Public Use, 27 RUTGERS L. REC. 3, Part V. (2003).
185.
See County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004).
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opment would not be. Professor Epstein, for one, appears to favor this
tighter interpretation of the public-use requirement.18 6 The governmental
title approach would also allow for the continuation of some of the supposedly core purposes of eminent domain under liberal ideas of good
governance - public places such as parks, schools, and community centers.
But there are some serious drawbacks to the governmental title approach. Such a restriction would eliminate some putatively "good" uses
of the governmental power. Eminent domain in Part III scenarios 5
("building avenues"), 6 ("widget town") 7 ("revitalization complex") and
8 ("playing ball, revisited") each would be unlawful. One might view
such a restriction as the necessary cost of reining in the potential for governmental abuse. Nonetheless, it would be an odd system of law that
allowed government to regulate private property so as to prohibit its most
profitable uses and to reduce its value by 80% or so and not owe compensation, as is permitted under current law,1 87 yet prohibit government
from using eminent domain, with full compensation, for the purpose of
fostering a seemingly worthy cause, such as the low-income housing
revitalization complex in scenario 7. Moreover, if fee simple ownership
were the criterion, crafty governments could circumvent the restriction.
Governments could take property by eminent domain and enter into
long-term leases with private tenants, thus retaining ownership while
providing the land for private "use." The public-use standard could, of
course, be modified further to require that the land be subject to some
sort of governmental control or other restriction. Such compromises lead
naturally to the second approach for restricting eminent domain.
A special circumstances approach was followed the Michigan Supreme Court in 2004's County of Wayne v. Hatchock188 It was also proposed by the dissenting United
89 States Supreme Court justices in 2005's
London.'
New
of
City
v.
Kelo
By overruling the infamous Poletown decision, Michigan took the
lead in developing a tighter state law doctrine of eminent domain. The
Hathcock case resembled Poletown in many respects: the county (which
encompasses Detroit and numerous suburbs) wanted to condemn a num186. See EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 170-73 (criticizing the unlimited reach of eminent domain).
187. See, e.g., Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 408-09 (1915) (holding that a regulation
preventing owner from continuing to use the property as a brick kiln and deprived the owner of the
bulk of the value of the property was not unconstitutional); Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272
U.S. 365, 384 (1926) (finding 75% reduction is acceptable); Pace Res., Inc. v. Shrewsbury Twp.,
808 F.2d 1023, 1031 (3d Cir. 1987) (finding 89% reduction is not a taking).
188. 684 N.W.2d at 775.
189.
See Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2673 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Justice O'Connor, joined by other property rights conservatives, sought to allow eminent domain
only when the condemned land (1) would be owned by the public, (2) is transferred to a private
common carrier, such as a railroad or utility, or (3) has been taken by government because of some
"affirmative harm" caused by the private land use. See id.at 2673-75.
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ber of privately owned parcels near Detroit's Metropolitan Airport' 90 for
the purpose of a 1,300-acre business and technology park. 19' The county
hoped that the "Pinnacle Project," which would include a conference
center, hotel, recreational facilities, and space for business, would create
thousands of jobs and add hundreds of millions of dollars of tax revenue
for the county.' 92 Much of the land would be transferred to private ownership. Wayne County secured hundreds of acres for the project through
voluntary sales, but nineteen
owners refused to sell, triggering a county
93
condemnation proceeding.'
Although not doubting the "public benefit" of the project, the
Michigan Supreme Court nonetheless held that the plan failed to meet a
state's constitutional public-use requirement for eminent domain. Although it called private property "sacrosanct,"'' 94 the court did not impose
a governmental title requirement. 95 Rather, returning to pre-Poletown
precedent, the court concluded that eminent domain destined for private
ownership is sometimes permissible. 196 Three special circumstances
justify condemnation of land destined for private hands. First, condemned land may be transferred if a private project would face intolerable burdens of "assembly" without eminent domain; transportation corridors such as railroads and canals, which must follow fairly direct paths,
supposedly fit within this category.' 97 Second, private parties may receive condemned land if it remains "accountable" to the public through
pervasive regulation, such as electric and water power utilities.' 98 Third,
if the specific piece of land subject to condemnation is of "special con99
cern," then the government may seize and transfer it to private parties.'
In Michigan's In re Slum Clearance case of 195 1,200 the government's
desire to remove specific slums justified eminent domain, even though
the land was then sold to private parties. Because the Pinnacle Project in
Hathcock failed to meet any of these three special exceptions, the Michigan Supreme Court held that it could not justify a constitutional exercise
of eminent domain. 20'

190.
See Hatchock, 684 N.W.2d at 770.
191.
In today's business jargon, the word "technology" no longer means the use of science to
create useful things, but refers specifically to computer-related and microelectronic-related businesses.
192.
See Hatchock, 684 N.W.2d at 770.
193. Id.
194.
Id.at 769. Did the court really mean this? Is private property truly "sacrosanct," meaning
that it cannot be touched? Of course not. No one doubts that the county could have taken the plaintiffs' property for a police station, without any restriction other than to pay just compensation.
195.
See id at 765.
196.
See id.at 781.
197.
Id.
198.
Id.at 782.
199. Id. at 782-83.
200.
50 N.W.2d 340, 343 (Mich. 1951).
201.
Hathcock, 689 N.W. 2d at 783-85.
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As do many courts when they make significant changes in the law,
the Michigan Supreme Court took pains to play down the shift. Characterizing Poletown as a radical departure from earlier precedent, the court
modestly stated that it was merely returning to its earlier, more restrictive
approach to eminent domain.2 °2 Moreover, as often occurs when a court
ventures into new territory, the Michigan court failed to explain why its
citation of three special circumstances - and only these three - were the
only permissible uses of eminent domain of land destined for private
ownership. In particular, it seems difficult to distinguish why the removal of an undesirable land use, as in the Slum Clearancecase, justifies
eminent domain while the placement of a desirable land use, as in Hathcock, does not. The court's explanation that the act of removing a slum
is a public "use," while the Pinnacle Project would not be, seems unconvincing.20 3 Both plans appear to create a putative public benefit, but
without permanent ownership by the public. Moreover, by allowing
eminent domain to be based on a stated undesirability of the current land
use, the reasoning in Hathcock would do nothing to affect the "blight"
determinations that form a very common basis for perceived abuse of
eminent domain. 20 4 By declaring property "blighted," a government can
avoid entirely Hathcock's tightening of the reach of eminent domain.
Nonetheless, despite the details it leaves unresolved, Hathcock may
prove to be a rallying point for property rights critics, by virtue of its
conclusion that "alleviating unemployment and revitalizing the economic
20 5
base of the community" is not a justification for eminent domain.
The Hathcock court's job was made easier by its decision not to follow the third general approach to tightening eminent domain - the closer
scrutiny approach.20 6 By relying on old precedent that allowed eminent
domain only for specific purposes, the court did not have to wade into
the thorny ground of trying to second-guess the governmental assertions
of the public benefit to be realized by the planned redevelopment.
"There is ample evidence in the record that the Pinnacle Project would
benefit the public," the court wrote. 20 7 "The development is projected to
bring jobs to the struggling local economy, add to tax revenues and
202. Id.at 784-85.
203.
Just as eminent domain is of course not the only way to spur economic development,
eminent domain is not the only way to eliminate or ameliorate an undesirable land use. Voluntary
purchases, even with a premium, zoning changes, and orders under the law of nuisance are among
other ways for government to change land use.
204. See generally Pritchett, supra note 4, at 3 (outlining the history of abuse of the "blight"
designation).
205. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 787.
206.
The U.S. Supreme Court in Kelo also rejected such an approach. See Kelo, 125 S.Ct. at
2667-69 (rejecting the plaintiffs' alternative argument that the courts should assess whether a development project is "reasonably certain" to provide significant public benefits). The dissenters also
did not suggest a closer scrutiny approach; they proposed instead that the federal constitutional law
follow the special circumstances approach. See id.at 2673-75 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (setting
forth the circumstances under which eminent domain would be constitutional).
207. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 778.
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thereby increase the resources available for public services, and attract
investors and businesses to the area, thereby reinvigorating the local
economy. 20 8 The judges did not attempt to evaluate whether the private
businesses that might profit from the Pinnacle Project pulled strings
within the Wayne County government. Nor did they attempt to scrutinize the magnitude of the supposed economic benefits of the plan or try
to balance this benefit with the psychological and social harm imposed
on the nineteen owners whose property was to be condemned. One can
easily understand why the court might have been reluctant to take on
such Herculean tasks. Nonetheless, many legal commentators have suggested tighter judicial scrutiny as the preferred solution to the abuse of
eminent domain.
The greaterscrutiny approach holds the promise of separating the
"bad" uses of eminent domain from the "good." Nonetheless, it faces
extraordinary hurdles. Professor Nicole Stelle Garnett has argued that
courts could subject eminent domain to the demanding scrutiny that the
Rehnquist Court called for in cases of "exactions" - when government
20 9
demands property concessions in return for granting a land use permit.
Under this test, the governmental exaction must have both a reasonable
nexus to and "rough proportionality" to the perceived harm that would
result from the permitted activity. 210 While this type of scrutiny seems at
first blush to be a promising avenue for a tighter eminent domain standard, I suggest that, in practice, it is likely to be a dead end.
Exactions have been, in recent years, among the hottest battlegrounds for the property rights movement. Using the Fifth Amendment's right against uncompensated taking of private property,2 ' property rights proponents have argued that governments unconstitutionally
condition the granting of land use permits. Justice Antonin Scalia, who
has been the leading advocate on the Supreme Court, has characterized
some such demands as "out-and-out... extortion."' 12 In Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, the Supreme Court held unconstitutional a
state agency's demand that beachfront-property-owners grant the public
an easement to the beach in return for a permit to rebuild their house.21 3
Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia was dubious of the government's
assertion of the supposed police-power reasons for the easement exaction
- the commission had contended that the rebuilt house would interfere
with "visual access" to the beach and impose a "psychological bar-

208. Id.
209. See Garnett, supra note 13, at 936-37.
210. See Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n., 483 U.S. 825, 836-37 (1987) (requiring an "essential
nexus"); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994) (requiring "rough proportionality").
211.
U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.").
212. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837.
213. Id. at 827-32.
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rier.''214 Finding such assertions to be inadequate, the Court held that

there must be an "essential nexus" between the exaction and the property
owner's request.2 15 Justice Scalia did not hide his suspicion that the California agency had simply used the building permit request as an excuse
to squeeze the easement out of the landowner.2 16 When a government
exacts, he wrote, "there is heightened risk that the purpose is avoidance
of the compensation requirement, rather than the stated police-power
objective. 21 7 It may be good public policy to improve public access to
the beach, he concluded, and the government may use "its power of eminent domain for this 'public purpose,' . . . but2 18if it wants an easement
across the Nollans' property, it must pay for it."
Judicial scrutiny of exactions tightened with Dolan v. City of Ti2 19 which
gard,
involved a demanding Oregon agency. In that case, a
plumbing and electrical supply store owner needed a permit to double the
size of her store and lay asphalt for a parking lot. 220 In return for granting the permit, the city demanded that she comply with the city's "open
space" requirement (imposed in part to decrease the amount of stormwater that entered the storm sewers) and required that she dedicate a strip of
property along a floodplain for a stretch of a regional pedestrian/bicycle
pathway. 221 The city argued the pathway requirement was closely related
to the planned land use because a bigger store would generate increased
traffic.22 2 The Court held, however, that the exaction must be "roughly
proportional" to the plan's projected impact.223 In other words, the government's demands cannot be too large. An elephant gun cannot be shot
at a gnat. In Dolan, the city failed the test because it made no "individualized determination" of the relative size of the projected impact; the
government must make some effort to quantify its demand and relate it to
the perceived impact of the land use plan.224
Parallels plainly exist between the abuses of exactions and the
abuses of eminent domain. Both governmental powers are susceptible to
governments using pretexts to justifying its actions. But the chief concern with exactions - that government may be trying to avoid compensation - obviously does not exist with eminent domain. Compare Nollan
and Dolan with Hathcock. In Nollan, the government failed to provide
214. Id. at 838-39. Justice Brennan argued that courts should defer if the government's judgment "could rationally have decided' that the exaction served an important objective. Id.at 843
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
215. Id.at 837.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 841.
218. Id.at 841-42.
219. 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
220. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 379.
221.
Id.at 379-80.
222. Id. at 389.
223.
Id.at 391.
224.
See id.
at 391-93.
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persuasive evidence that the easement exaction was closely related to the
expected impact of the Nollans' larger house; the government was presumed to be trying to get something for nothing.225 There is no parallel
in Hathcock. There, the county was offering something to the landowners: just compensation for their property.226 True, money might not fully
compensate a landowner for the psychic and social losses generated by
losing property; however, this is a potential complication with any exercise of eminent domain, even in uncontroversial takings of land for governmental title uses. 2 2 7 Moreover, any parallel between exactions and
eminent domain breaks down when we analyze what government may be
"hiding" by pretext. With exactions, the typical abuse is that government
desires to create a public benefit - such as the beach easement in Nollan
or the bike path in Dolan - and uses the pretext of land use regulation 228
to
have a landowner, not taxpayer funds, bear the burden of paying for it.
By contrast, with eminent domain, the assertions of pretext typically are
not that the authority is hiding its reasons for targeting the particular
landowner. 229 Rather, allegations of pretext typically concern the government's motivation for using eminent domain, such as the concern that
Detroit unwisely succumbed to pressure from General Motors in taking
the Poletown neighborhood. 230 By contrast, the Supreme Court in both
Nollan and Dolan stressed that the exactions inquiry was not to scrutinize the value of the asserted public benefit, such as the beach easement
or bike path, but rather to scrutinize the imposition of the burden on the
private landowner.23 '
A tighter law of eminent domain could, of course, turn on a stricter
scrutiny of the government's motivations. Scrutiny of underlying reasons is notoriously difficult, but not impossible. The laws against race
and sex discrimination charge courts with determining whether, say, the
motivation for firing an employee was poor job performance or unlawful
racial animus.232 The extraordinarily hard task of parsing motivation
from ostentation is justified in large part because of the importance of
excising such discrimination from society. Property rights advocates, of
course, might argue that the right to land should be given equal respect.
Even so, it is understandable why no court has taken on the onerous task
225.
Nollan, 483 U.S. at 841-42.
226. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 771.
227. See, e.g., Garnett, supra note 13, at 945 (discussing the psychological costs of losing one's
property by eminent domain); Fennell, supra note 96, at 966-67 (costs of loss of "autonomy").
228. See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 841-42; Dolan,512 U.S. at 391-93.
229. An exception is the category of claims that government has targeted a particular group
because of its race. See, e.g., Pritchett, supra note 4, at 47 (assertions of "Negro removal").
230. See generally Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765 (overruling Poletown).
231.
See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 841-42; Dolan,512 U.S. at 391-93.
232. See, e.g., Pamela S. Karlan & Daryl J. Levinson, Why Voting Is Different, 84 CAL. L. REv.
1201, 1214-15 (1996) (discussing the complexities of discerning racial motivation in legislative
decisions); Pers. Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979) (setting forth a standard for
claims of racial motivation under the Fourteenth Amendment).
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of trying to scrutinize the true motivations of government in exercising
eminent domain.
Moreover, the second step of the exactions test - Dolan's requirement of "rough proportionality" - does not fit the problem of abusive
eminent domain.2 33 Under Dolan, the government must make at least a
rough assessment of the magnitude of the perceived harm with the property owner's requested land use and then compare this with the exaction
demanded in return. With eminent domain, law might begin by calculating the public benefit of the project for which the property is being condemned. The government could be required to estimate how many jobs
might be created and how much money would be added to the local
economy each year. Such a requirement might be an effective way to
ferret out the worst abuses of eminent domain, such as a condemnations
incurred by bribery. But with most large-scale eminent domain projects,
however, the government already makes such calculations. For the Pinnacle Project at issue in Hathcock, for example, the county said that it
expected more than 30,000 jobs and millions of dollars to be added to the
economy.234 One might ask whether such figures were seen through
rose-colored glasses, but tighter judicial scrutiny would generate the
usual problems of tasking the courts with second-guessing the economic
conclusions of elected executives, legislatures, or their delegated agencies. 235 The usual solution in administrative law is merely to require that
the government show that it has done a decent job of compiling the relevant data and explaining it; the final decision of whether to go forward
with a project is left to the political branches.236 Law might be able to
develop a doctrine that says, "If a court concludes that a development
project will provide little or no economic or public benefit, it should set
aside the condemnation," but this would be a tall order for any judge.
An even more fundamental dilemma in applying Dolan's "rough
proportionality" comparison is to figure out what to compare the perceived benefits with. One obvious choice would be the amount of the
compensation. If the government has to pay $2 million dollars in compensation to take land for a project that is expected to add a discounted
value of only $1 million for the local economy, this would seem to be an
unwise use of governmental power. But such an anomaly would not
seem to be a source of complaint for the landowners (who would get the
233.
See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391.
234.
Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 770-71.
235.
See, e.g., Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 772 (noting that in the context of eminent domain the
court is limited to reviewing a public agency's determination that a condemnation serves a public
necessity only for "fraud, error of law, or abuse of discretion.").
236.
See, e.g., Haw. Pub. Hous. Auth. v Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 239-40 (1984) (deferring to the
government's findings as to the benefits of a project fostered by eminent domain); see also Ewing v.
California, 538 U.S. 11, 36 (2003) (courts should defer to policy judgments); Chem. Mfrs. Ass'n v.
Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 470 U.S. 116, 138 (1985); Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 740
(1983).
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$2 million) as much as for the taxpayers; thus it would form a poor basis
for a personal property right. In essence, such a test would merely determine whether the government is paying too much for the land. In fact,
landowners would be faced with the contradictory task of arguing, in
effect, that the government is paying them relatively too much for the
land. (If the just compensation could be re-evaluated to $500,000, for
example, the project would then seem worthwhile for the community,
even though the landowners would end up worse off.)
Moreover, balancing value with cost would be a difficult and controversial task in eminent domain. Libertarians argue, with some force,
that government-sponsored projects often shift economic activity from
one set of businesses, which are not aided by the government, to another
set, which in effect are subsidized by the new development plan. 23 7 The
high-technology businesses that would be helped by Wayne County's
Pinnacle Project might simply take money and jobs away from other
companies that did not have the luck, or perhaps the political savvy, to
secure government assistance. At best, the skeptical critique goes, government-subsidized development simply moves jobs from one area to
another, and governments are caught in a dilemma of trying to outsubsidize their neighbors to attract business.2 38 A quintessential example
is professional sports, in which governments quite openly pay, through
building multi-million-dollar stadiums and other financial incentives, to
lure teams away from other cities. 239 Like any instance of paying to get a
reward, much or all of the financial benefits are lost with the payment. 240
Governments should
refrain, the critique concludes, from interfering with
the free market.24 1
Political skeptics also point out that eager local governments often
have an incentive to inflate the expected financial benefits of development projects. 4 2 Politicians realize that voters are attracted to those who
claim that they can give something for nothing - that by wise use of eminent domain and other projects, they can claim to boost the area's economy. Those more sober candidates who emphasize the limits of gov237.

See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 168, at 1451-53 (touting the efficiency of the market and

criticizing governmental meddling).
238.

See Charles Tiebout, A Pure Theory ofLocal Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416, 418-20

(1956) (arguing that competing local governments act as a "market" in which citizens may choose
where to live); see also KANTOR, supra note 15, at 2 (discussing the incentive of cities to try to pay
to attract business).
239.

See, e.g., Andrew H. Goodman, The Public Financingof ProfessionalSports Stadiums:

Policy andPractice,9 SPORTS LAW. J. 173 (2002) (discussing the variety of public financing).
240.
See Peter Sepulveda, Comment, The Use of the Eminent Domain Power in the Relocation
of Sports Stadiums to UrbanAreas: Is the Public Purpose Requirement Satisfied? II SETON HALL
J. SPORT L. 137, 148-50 (2002).

241.
See, e.g., National Platform of the Libertarian Party, Adopted May 2004,
http://lp.org/issues/platform-all.shtml (setting out Libertarian party's position re free market).
242. See, e.g., ROGER AND ME (Warner Bros. Inc. 1989) (filmmaker Michael Moore's first
movie, detailing, among other things, the ill-fated effort of his hometown, Flint, Mich., to succeed
with a theme park called "Autoworld").
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ernmental power are simply not as appealing. It is unlikely, however,
that courts can do a better job of policing this political phenomenon than
they can of assessing the true economic value of a development plan. In
sum, the approach to reforming eminent domain of requiring courts to
give greater scrutiny to governments' economic policy decisions is likely
to be a dead end.
VI. THE SOLUTION OF REPRESENTATION REINFORCEMENT

A rule of eminent domain that requires courts to scrutinize economic claims is, moreover, likely to be most beneficial to those parties
that hold the financial resources necessary to marshal expert witnesses
and complicated data inherent in such challenges.2 43 This result would
be especially unwelcome, considering the perceived abuse of ordinary
citizens in losing their land to well-connected businesses through eminent domain.2 "
If economic justification were the touchstone, then
businesses and other institutions would be in a better position to win
complex cases than would individual homeowners.
A more compelling argument for a tighter law of eminent domain, I
suggest, is to preserve the personal integrity of the citizen's home and to
avoid the psychic and social damages associated with the loss of a home,
despite monetary compensation.2 45 Accordingly, I propose, the law
should focus not on the reasons for the government's decision to use its
power, but rather on the claims of those private citizens who serve as the
unwanted targets of eminent domain. To craft such a rule I suggest reliance on the "representation reinforcement" theory of judicial review.
A. RepresentationReinforcement andPoliticalParticipation
Under the theory of the late professor John Hart Ely, the interpretation of individual constitutional rights should not depend upon a delineation of certain "fundamental" substantive rights.246 Rather, rights are
better interpreted as circumstances in which law does not trust the
elected legislature to protect the interests of those who lack political
clout. 247 Review should focus, Ely wrote, "only on questions of participation, and
not with the substantive merits of the political choice under
248
attack.
243.
See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Competing and Complementary Rule Systems: Civil Procedure
and ADR: Procedure as Contract, 80 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 593, 615 n.83 (2005) (discussing the
advantages of the "repeat player" in any adversarial setting).
244.
See, e.g., Nader & Hirsch, supra note 13, at 219-22.
245. See, e.g., Garnett, supra note 13, at 946 (discussing the psychological costs of losing one's
property by eminent domain); Fennell, supra note 96, at 957 (discussing costs of loss of "autonomy").
246.
See generally ELY, supra note 22.
247.
See id.
248.
Id.at 181. Ely's focus on process, as opposed to substantive rights, generated considerable criticism from various comers, from which substance is seen as still crucially important. See,
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The representation reinforcement approach avoids the crippling
faults of both of the traditional camps of constitutional interpretation.
The first method, which Ely called "clause-bound interpretivism," and
which others might call "textualism" or "original intent," calls for unearthing the supposed intention of the eighteenth and nineteenth century
drafters of the Constitution. 249 But many constitutional rights, including
"freedom of speech, 2 5 0 "due process, ' 25' and "equal protection, 252 were
written with broad, amorphous phrases that seem to cry out for evolving
interpretations in different ages and under varying circumstances. 3
With all of these rights, Ely argued, both the history and textual phrasing
seem to point to a concern over the procedure of social, political, and
judicial actions.2 54 With free speech, for example, the concern is that all
persons are able to participate in the public debate, not that any particular
utterances need special protection. 255 The right to due process mandates
deliberate and meticulous consideration in a wide variety of legal and
judicial proceedings, in order to ensure that certain persons are not
treated in a cursory or haphazard manner.25 6 And with equal protection,
the fear once again is that certain persons - especially African Americans
- would fail to receive an equal say in the development of laws and civic
opportunities.2 57
The traditional alternative to clause-bound interpretivism, on the
other hand, frees judges to create their own conceptions of what values
are "fundamental." Giving such power to judges, however, is inherently
undemocratic. As Ely pointed out, this judicial power allows courts to
override the decisions of the public's elected officials (or their bureaucratic delegates) and impose their own social, political, and moral judgments upon society. 258 At some level, almost everyone agrees that
judges should be constrained; one might agree with the outcomes of Roe
e.g., TERRI JENNINGS PERETTI, IN DEFENSE OF A POLITICAL COURT 44-50 (1999); Paul Brest, The
FundamentalRights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of Nonnative Constitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063, 1092-93 (1981); Samuel Estreicher, Platonic Guardiansof Democracy:
John Hart Ely's Role for the Supreme Court in the Constitution's Open Texture, 56 N.Y.U. L. Rev.
547, 578 (1981); Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional
Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063, 1064-65 (1980); Mark Tushnet, Darkness on the Edge of Town: The
Contributionsof John Hart Ely to ConstitutionalTheory, 89 YALE L.J. 1037, 1045 (1980). I do not
seek to add to the debate over Ely's general theory, but rather to employ it in one context - eminent
domain.
249.
See ELY, supra note 22, at 11.
250. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (proclaiming right to "freedom of speech").
251.
See U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV (controlling how both the national and state governments may deprive a person of life, life, or property).
252.
See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (describing the "equal protection" guarantee, which at its
genesis concerned the rights of African Americans). See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303,
309 (1880).
253.
See ELY, supra note 22, at 11-13.
254. See id.at 13.
255.
See id.
256.
See id.at 14-22.
257.
See id at 32-41.
258.
See id at 43-48.
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v. Wade259 or Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council260 or both, but
few believe that courts should return to the days of Lochner v. New
York. 261 None of the proposed touchstones for "doing the right thing" natural law, neutral principles, tradition, or consensus - is able to rein in
judges from simply acting as super-legislatures, using their own values to
decide what is best for society.262
The solution to the dilemma, Ely concluded, is to view constitutional rights as "policing the process of representation.' ' 6 3 Building from
the famous footnote four of the Supreme Court's decision in United
States v. Carolene Products,26 this approach presumes that most decisions of the political branches are reasonable ones - thus the doctrine of
judicial deference, which spans across all fields of law.265 Only when
laws do special harm to those minority groups who are likely to hold less
clout in the political and lawmaking process should courts intervene. 66
What the eighteenth-century framers, such as James Madison, were most
concerned about, and what modem judicial review should focus on, Ely
2 67 Courts should not try
argued, is participation.
to focus on "whether
this or that substantive value is unusually important or fundamental," he
wrote, "but rather on whether the opportunity to participate either in the
political processes .. .or in the accommodation those processes have
reached, has been unduly constricted. ' 2 68 As shown by the groundbreaking decisions of the Supreme Court under Chief Justice Earl Warren, Ely
argued that judges are uniquely qualified, by virtue of their distance from
day-to-day politics and long tenure, to think about whether the minority
has been hurt by a "malfunction" in the political process. 269 The goal of
judicial review, Ely therefore concluded, should be "unblocking stoppages in the democratic process ...[w]e cannot trust the ins [in the political process] to decide who stays out." 270 Courts should "protect those
who can't protect themselves politically," he concluded. 271 "The whole
259. Roe v. Wade 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (describing constitutional right to abort one's fetus).
260. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council 505 U.S. 1003, 1030 (1992) (holding that a land use regulation is a compensable taking of private property if it prohibits "all economically productive or beneficial use of the land").
261.
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905) (stating government could not regulate
working hours because it violates an unenumerated right to contract).
262. See ELY, supra note 22, at 48-72.
263.
Id. at 73.
264. United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (noting that courts
should protect "discrete and insular minorities").
265.
See ELY, supra note 22, at 78. For leading cases on deference, see, e.g., Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 36 (2003) (confirming courts should defer to policy judgments); Chemical Mfrs.
Ass'n v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 470 U.S. 116, 138 (1985); Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S.
725, 740 (1983).
266.
See Ely, supranote 22, at 79
267.
See id. at 78-82.
268.
ELY, supranote 22, at 77 (discussing the history of judicial review).
269.
See id.
(discussing the Warren court).
270. Id.at 117.
271.
See id.
at 152.
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point of the approach is to identify those groups in society to whose
needs 2and wishes elected officials have no apparent interest in attend27
ing.
Writing in the early 1980s, not far from the end of the civil rights
era, Ely naturally considered the quintessential poorly-represented minority group to be African Americans, and he focused on laws based on
prejudice against, or stereotype of, African Americans. 7 3 Nonetheless,
Ely recognized that courts should be protective of other groups, such as
aliens, who cannot vote. 74 An even larger minority group is "the poor,"
though Ely felt that the problems of the poor most often stemmed from
the government's failure to provide them with needed services - not
from affirmative steps to disadvantage them. 275 Using the example of the
death penalty, however, he argued that a punishment that "people like
us" need not worry about - meaning the majority of middle-class citizens
who hold some clout in the political process - is the quintessential kind
of legal decision
in which "some nonpolitical check on excessive sever276
ity is needed.,
Despite the recognition that Ely's approach has received in academia, it has suffered from a shortcoming of many scholarly ideas - a failure to be explicitly recognized by the practitioners of law. While a number of courts have cited Ely's thoughts on various aspects of constitutional law and interpretation, and while some courts have agreed with the
idea that laws concerning racial minorities deserve special scrutiny, few
courts have cited or relied on Ely's specific prescription - the approach
of representation reinforcement.2 77 Ely's theory has been useful as an
explanation for why protection of racial minorities has been such an important feature of American law, 278 but it has not done much to develop a
practical philosophy of judicial review for other categories of claims. In
the twenty-first century, fewer laws stereotype racial minorities. Accordingly, it remains a challenge to apply Ely's theory to strengthen the
claims of other categories of persons who deserve to have their representation reinforced.

272. Id. at 151.
273.
Seeid. at 155-57.
274. See id. at 161-62.
275. Seeid. at 161-62.
276. See id. at 173.
277.
While a handful of federal or state courts have cited Ely's theory, they usually do so to
help support claims of well-recognized minority groups, such as racial minorities, immigrants, or
prisoners. See, e.g., Kane v. Winn, 319 F. Supp. 2d 162, 203 n.65 (D. Mass. 2004) (evaluating
prisoner rights case); State ex rel. Cooper v. Caperton, 470 S.E.2d 162, 171 (W. Va. 1996) (discussing minority rights).
278. See, e.g., League of United Latin American Citizens v. Clements, 999 F.2d 831, 858 (5th
Cir. 1993) (citing Ely for race discrimination claim).
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B. RepresentationReinforcement and Eminent Domain
The dilemma of eminent domain, I suggest, is an excellent match
for representation reinforcement. Poorer citizens - owners of modest
homes, apartment dwellers, and small businesspersons - are quintessential "outs" in local government decision-making. 279 When government
considers whether to use eminent domain, we can easily understand why
local officials have "no apparent interest in attending" to the needs and
wishes of the poor. 280 The incentives noted by Tiebout's model lead
governments to discourage the participation of poorer citizens in favor of
more affluent persons. 281 For governments that are concerned with improving their tax bases, it simply is not economical to pay attention to the
needs or desires of the poor. 282 Indeed, the usual ace-in-the-hole for poor
persons - their ability to vote in elections with the same clout as the rich
- may conceivably be lost with eminent domain, which enables governments to, quite literally, expel poor people from a locality and its voting
booths. 28 3 If law is to grant property owners some sort of right not to
have their land taken through eminent domain, it makes sense to begin
with the category of persons who are the most likely and sympathetic
targets of abusive eminent domain.
Most academic critics, to date, have proposed greater scrutiny by
focusing on the end use of the land after the condemnation.28 4 Taking
their cue from the "public use" requirement, critics seek to tighten eminent domain by asking courts to provide greater scrutiny in cases in
which the land is destined for private hands.2 85 Condemnation for a public highway would be nearly always acceptable, no matter how dubious
the highway project is. 2 86 Meanwhile condemnation for a redevelopment
project, such as for an urban shopping complex, would be inherently
279.

See ELY, supra note 22, at 20 (professing law should protect the "outs" from the tyranny

of the "ins").
280.

Id. at 151. (arguing that identifying and protecting such groups should be the primary

responsibility of courts in asserting rights).
281.
See Tiebout, supra note 120, at 418. (arguing that state governments may compete to
attract residents). Professor Gerald Frug has proposed that, in order to increase the clout of citizens

over their metropolitan area, they be permitted to vote in jurisdictions in which they do not reside.
Professor Frug suggests just such a solution. See Gerald Frug, DecenteringDecentralization,60 U.
CH. L. Rrv. 253, 324-30 (1993).
282.
See, e.g., Tiebout, supra note 120.
283.
See, e.g., Harris, Jr., supra note 4, at 12 (complaining of governmental efforts to discour-

age or remove African American residents).
284. See, e.g., Garnett, supra note 13 at 934-36.
285. See, e.g., id at 936-37 (contending that the standard should employ the law of land use
"exactions," which requires an assessment of the need for the governmental regulation); Jones, supra
note 19, at 302 (arguing for flipping the presumption against the government in private end use
cases).

286. See, e.g., Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 411-13 (1971)
(setting aside a plan to build an interstate highway through Overton Park in Memphis,Tenn.); N.C.
Dep't of Transp. v. Crest St. Cmty. Council, Inc., 479 U.S. 6, 9 (1986) (suggesting that the construction of an expressway through an African American neighborhood would constitute a violation of
the residents' Title VII rights)
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more suspect.287 But, as I have endeavored to explain, a focus on the end
use may turn out to be an unsatisfactory solution for property owners.
From the perspective of the landowner, losing one's land for a suspect
highway is not any less unpleasant than losing one's land for a suspect
shopping center. The fact that the highway is public property is unlikely
to assuage the feelings of the landowner whose property is taken. A requirement that the end use be governmental is unlikely to match those
cases in which losses by landowners arouse the greatest sympathy. 28 8 It
is unfairness to those who appear to have "lost" in the political process
that should be the focus of a tighter law of eminent domain.289
Moreover, a strict governmental title requirement is unlikely to
mesh well with the examples of eminent domain driven by undue private
influence. 290 A highway, after all, may be just as susceptible as a shopping complex to being spurred by abuse. Highway construction companies and those who own land near the exits, for example, may be just as
adept as shopping mall developers in twisting government to suit their
desires.2 9' Viewing the question from the other side, some private enduses, such as a low-cost housing development and shopping centers in
depressed inner city areas, may serve the public interest better than some
purely public end-uses, such as a highway built to serve yet another
sprawling upscale housing development or super-mall built on former
forest land. If a goal is to stop economically dubious projects, greater
scrutiny only of eminent domain destined for private ownership would
not stop the potential for abuse.
1. A Proposed New Requirement for Eminent Domain
I propose, by contrast, that a tighter law of eminent domain focus
not on the end use, but on the landownerswhose property is taken or, for
lack of a better term, the "targets" of eminent domain. In particular, I
propose that law focus on those categories of cases in which we perceive
that it is most unfair for the owners or residents to lose their property,
especially those cases in which we suspect that residents have failed to
have their voices heard in the political process. Because eminent domain
comes with monetary compensation, the chief harm to the landowner
comes from the psychological and social injury, and the loss of personal
287.
Brief of Petitioners at 9-11, Kelo v. New London, 125 S. Ct. 2665 (2005) (arguing against
permitting eminent domain for the governmental purpose of economic development) (No. 04-108).
288.
See Garnett, supra note 13, at 944-49 (discussing the psychological and economic losses
suffered by ousted landowners).
289.
See infra Part VI.B. 1.
290.
See, e.g., Nader & Hirsch, supra note 13, at 218-24 (emphasizing the disparity in political
power between small landowners and large corporations in eminent domain cases for private redevelopment).
291.
See, e.g., Robert D. Bullard, Addressing Urban Transportation Equity in the United
States, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1183, 1192 (2004) (discussing the power of the highway lobby, written by one of the founders of the "environmental justice" movement to provide racial equity in land
use decisions).
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autonomy, associated with condemnation.29 2 Being evicted from one's
home, by no fault of one's own, is likely to alienate one further from
one's government and community.293 This is especially true when the
locality is admittedly trying to replace certain housing stock - and perhaps even categories of people - with others. The burdens of having to
leave the condemned residence and find another home is a cost that the
just compensation requirement may not address fully - and when a town
is trying to improve its tax base by eliminating low-cost (and low-taxed)
housing and encouraging high-cost (and high-taxed) housing, it is a truism that a poor household may find it difficult to obtain comparable
housing in the "upscaled" community. 294 Having to move far from one's
home poses an array of problems, of course, including the potential difficulties of a longer commute to work, the need for children to move
schools, and the loss of connections to the community, such as places of
worship, neighborhood friends, and social groups.295 For businesses
taken by eminent domain, there also may be consequential losses not
monetarily compensated for by eminent domain, such as the loss of
"goodwill" built up in the neighborhood.296 Nonetheless, considering the
significance of damages to the personal integrity associated with the loss
of a family's home, I propose that a stricter law of eminent domain focus
on condemnations of personal residences. In sum, the law should
tighten eminent domain to reinforce the representation of persons whose
integrity is damaged by the loss of a residence - whether it be a house,
apartment, or mobile home.
Which facts should lead a reviewing court to invoke representation
reinforcement? First, I propose that the traditional legal standards applied to suspect racial minorities be extended to eminent domain. The
doctrine of disparate impact2 97 began in employment discrimination law
298
and has since been extended to other realms of discrimination law.
Unjustified disparate impact is unlawful because it roots out cases of
hidden conscious discrimination, and it forces changes to policies that
may provide similar benefits to the actor with fewer adverse effects on

292.
See Garnett, supra note 13, at 944-47 (discussing the psychological costs of condemnation
on small landowners); Fennell, supranote 96 (costs of loss of "autonomy").
293.
See Gamett, supra note 13, at 945-47.
294.
See Peterson, supra note 116, at A25 (explaining that one reason for the New London
condemnation is to encourage wealthier residents).
295.
See articles cited supra note 292.
296.
See, e.g., Alan T. Ackerman, Just Compensationfor the Condemnationof Going Concern
Value, 64 MICH. BAR J. 1314, 1317 n.56 (1985) (discussing the "usual rule" that goodwill is not
compensable).
297. This doctrine requires that actions which have an adverse impact on racial minorities be
supported by bona fide justifications. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 425-26,
436 (1971).
298.
See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 425-26, 436 (establishing "disparate impact" in employment
discrimination cases); Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 509-12 (2004) (applying "disparate impact"
analysis to discrimination against handicapped persons).
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the suspect groups. 299 Although the Supreme Court in Washington v.
Davis 00 held that the federal constitution's equal protection command
prohibits intentional discrimination, not disparate impact, there is no
textual reason why it should be permitted under statutory law but disallowed under the Fourteenth Amendment. 3 ° ' In any event, if law were to
apply to representation reinforcement to eminent domain, cases of disparate impact on suspect
classes, most prominently racial minorities, are a
30 2
logical place to start.
Moreover, although federal equal protection law has not included
poor people within the suspect class, the poor are the quintessentialcategory of persons deserving of representation reinforcement.3 3 Poor people merit protection for at least two compelling reasons. First, the poor
are likely to be disadvantaged in lobbying local governments and influencing eminent domain decisions. 30 4 Public choice theory reminds us that
policy decisions are often the result of one interest group prevailing over
others. 30 5 Second, under the Tiebout model of local governments, the
poor are the most likely targets of eminent domain, as a result of gov30 6
ernment efforts to maximize tax revenue and minimize expenditures.
An obstacle to representation reinforcement for the poor is, of
course, that it lacks an explicit textual basis in the United States Constitution's Fifth Amendment 30 7 or in most state constitutions. How could
representation reinforcement be melded into eminent domain's "public
use" restriction? Ely's theory considers that when a group fails to receive adequate representation in the halls of government, courts should
299.
See, e.g., George Rutherglen, DisparateImpact Under Title VII: An Objective Theory of
Discrimination,73 VA. L. REV. 1297 (1987) (setting forth justifications for finding discrimination
through disparate impact analysis).
300.
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238-48 (1976).
301.
Compare U.S. CONST. amend. V (requiring equal protection under the laws) with Fair
Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (2004) (proscribing discrimination "because of race" in renting or
selling real estate) and Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2004) (prohibiting discrimination "on the ground of race" for recipients of federal financial assistance).
302.
Applying eminent domain law to protect racial minorities would harmonize with the
"environmental justice" movement, which seeks to protect racial minorities from receiving a disproportionate share of the risks of environmental harms. Like eminent domain today, environmental
law did not consider the distributional effects of laws until the environmental justice movement
began in the 1980s. See generally EDWARD LAO RHODES, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE INAMERICA
(2003) (tracing the history of the environmental justice movement); ROBERT D. BULLARD, DUMPING
IN DIXIE: RACE, CLASS, AND ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY (1990) (providing one of the original discussions of the environmental justice movement); Tara R. Kebodeaux & Danielle M. Brock, Environmental Justice: A Choice Between Social Justice and Economic Development?, 28 S. U. L REV.
123 (2001) (discussing some of the contentious siting battles in Louisiana).
303.
See supra Part VI.A.
304.
See, e.g., Nader & Hirsch, supra note 13, at 219-24.
305.
Joseph P. Tomain & Sidney A. Shapiro, Analyzing Government Regulation, 49 ADMIN. L.
REV. 377, 392 (1997) (suggesting that under public choice theory, business groups may tend to
prevail in political struggles).
306.
See generallyTiebout, supranote 114.
307.
U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.").
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step in and ensure that all the "public" receives consideration. °8 Putting
this theory into action, eminent domain and its public-use requirement
could be interpreted as follows: Eminent domain would be impermissible if it both results in a private end-use and disproportionately harms
poor persons. Just as the disparate impact standard serves to pinpoint
otherwise-hard-to-detect forms of discrimination in employment, injecting the public-use standard with a dose of representation reinforcement
would give some force to the judicial inquiry of whether an exercise of
eminent domain really does serve the public. 30 9 Such a rule would be
more straightforward and easier to apply than having to balance the purported benefits of a particular development project, as others have proposed. 310 Government would be permitted to take land destined for private hands, but only if the land does not include the residences of poor
citizens. Taking commercial land or taking more upscale residences
would be permissible. Finally, government could take the residences of
poor persons, but it could do so only when the public retains ownership.
How would such a standard affect government-fostered redevelopment projects? I suspect that they would be hindered but not crippled.3 1'
Localities would still be encouraged to provide tax breaks and other incentives to attract new businesses; 312 more often, however, private developers would have to buy or lease the land on the private market, without
help from eminent domain.3 13 Governments would still be able to condemn private property for important redevelopment projects, but they
would be required to do so in a manner that did not disproportionately
harm the poorer citizens of the community. Some of the most egregious
impositions of eminent domain on the least powerful members of the
community might be avoided without unduly hampering government
efforts to foster economic development. The "fit" between impermissible uses of eminent domain and the perceived abuses of governmental
308. See ELY, supra note 22, at 135-59.
309.
When government takes the residences of poor persons and racial minorities, we have a
reason to fear that the eminent domain was motivated, at least in part, by undue influence from those
private parties who would benefit from the development, even if there is no proof of such undue
influence. Because of the inherent difficulty of proving such motivation in litigation, a legal rule can
avoid the likelihood of undue influence by requiring that government acts avoid the questionable
action. To avoid "false negatives" of hidden undue influence, we accept some "false positives" by
banning such government action altogether.
310. See, e.g., Garnett, supra note 13 (proposing greater scrutiny in public-use cases through a
parallel to the exactions test); Jones, supra note 19, at 286-87, 305-14 (proposing a flipping of the
public-use presumption that currently favors the government).
311.
See Brief of Law Professors Robert Freilich et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 16-17, Kelo v. New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005) (No. 04-108) (arguing that local governments would be crippled if prevented from using eminent domain for any and all redevelopment
plans).

312.
See, e.g., KANTOR, supra note 15 (explaining that cities compete to attract businesses).
313.
See ANDREW ALPERN & SEYMOUR DURST, HOLDOUTS! (1984) (discussing the phenomenon of landowners "holding out" against big development projects in New York City); DANIEL
OKRENT, GREAT FORTUNE 95-98 (2003) (discussing those who held out permanently against the
development of Rockefeller Center in midtown Manhattan, which was built anyway and became
arguably the most successful urban development project in American history).
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power would not be perfect, but would come as close possible under
practical law.
2. Other Applications of Representation Reinforcement
Another way in which the law could incorporate representation reinforcement would be to place more explicit lawmaking hurdles in the way
of eminent domain. Under the laws of most jurisdictions, local development agencies are created by government but often act very independently of legislative control.314 These agencies hold the power to wield
eminent domain, typically with only a subsequent rubber-stamp approval
process from a legislative body. 315 The isolation of these agencies makes
them unusually susceptible to coercion and influence, especially by
wealthy developers and influential citizens.3 16 Development agencies
often act in ways that would make legislators, who are directly responsive to the people at the ballot box, hesitate. This is especially true in
regard to using eminent domain to condemn homes.
A potential solution to the problem of development agencies is to
require that eminent domain be approved as regular legislation, not
through short-cut approvals by city councils, county commissioners, and
state legislatures.3 17 Given more public exposure than is usually provided in cursory administrative condemnations, legislative eminent domain would be subject to more open hearings and greater public scrutiny.
This is not to say that local legislators are not capable of being unduly
influenced or even bribed, but the hurdles that nearly all governments
impose on the adoption of new legislation provide some protection
against abuse and increase the chances that unwarranted exercises of
eminent domain may be exposed and stopped.318 Moreover, requiring
regular legislation also fits well with representation reinforcement.
Delegating decisions to administrative agencies makes the most sense
when the choice involves technical or scientific expertise.3 19 Such expertise may be needed in figuring out what sort of development project, if
any, a locality may need, assessing its potential benefits, and deciding to
where to locate it. Less susceptible to agency expertise, however, are the
difficult questions whether the social and psychological costs of con314.
See Garnett,supra note 13, at 974-75.
315.
Eminent domain is often approved by local governmental legislative bodies through an
abbreviated process. See, e.g., Garnett, supranote 13, at 970-72.
316.
See, e.g., Nader & Hirsch, supra note 13, at 221-26 (discussing the role of political power
in eminent domain).
317.
See Garnett, supra note 13, at 970-75 (discussing various "quick-take" procedures).
318.
See, e.g., Nader & Hirsch, supra note 13, at 231-32 (discussing the role of political power
in eminent domain).
319.
See, e.g., Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
865 (1984) (deferring to an agency interpretation where that interpretation is reasonable); FCC v.
Nat'l Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775, 814 (1978) (deferring to the "'expert knowledge of
the agency"') (quoting Federal Power Comm'n v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 365 U.S. 1,
29(1961)).
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demnation are justified. Such balancing should necessitate a vote by the
elected officials, through the public and open forum of regular legislation.
Another way to incorporate representation reinforcement would be
to expand the government's constituency. As I have explained, one of
the chief impetuses to abusive eminent domain is competition among
localities to attract high-taxpayers and discourage low-taxpaying citizens. 32 A way to dampen this unsavory competition is to require that
decisionmaking be made by a higher level of government.3 2' In a metropolitan area, an inter-governmental umbrella authority could replace each
locality in making eminent domain decisions. An even bolder approach
would be to demand that state authorities approve all uses of the power
to condemn. With the decision made at a higher level of government, the
desire of town A to compete with town B would be harder to translate
into action.322 If a regional authority were to make the choice, the desires
of the representatives of town A would be countered, presumably, by
opposition from the representatives of town B and the possible indifference of those from towns C and D. Although most Americans in the
twenty-first century are accustomed to thinking that all forms of competition are good, metropolitan and state-level decisionmaking would create
a useful "cartel" of government that would dampen Tiebout's model of
competition among localities. 323 With competition among close-by localities suppressed, the higher-level government would act in the best
interests of the wider geographic area - be it a metropolitan area or a
state - not just the best interests of one town. True, a bigger government
may still desire to attract upscale business centers and wealthy citizens.
Nonetheless, a higher-level authority is more likely to recognize that
using eminent domain to foster site-specific development may simply
move wealth around, from one locality to another. A higher-level government is more likely to be skeptical of the long-term economic advantages of local plans to develop through eminent domain.
The advantages of higher level decisionmaking to the poor are, of
course, not limited to condemnation. For benefits such as public education, welfare payments, and health care, local governments are more
likely to hesitate, knowing that generous services will attract those who
rely most heavily on government assistance, while the taxes needed for
such benefits will drive away the wealthy and mobile. Moving such decisions to a higher level of government is likely to yield better results for

320. See Part I, supra.
321.
See, e.g., Boudreaux, supra note 117, at 503-06 (arguing that governments compete to
discourage poor residents).
322. See id.
323.
See generally Tiebout, supra note 114 (arguing that competing state governments act as a
"market" in which citizens may choose where to live).
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the poorer citizens of a community. 324 This effect is nothing new. What
is new, however, is characterizing the avoidance of eminent domain as a
benefit of good government decisionmaking.
CONCLUSION

Eminent domain is close to unique among the workings of modem
government. From progressive taxation rates to subsidized public transportation to government-assisted health care, today's public welfare
functions usually help redistribute wealth in favor of the less affluent.
Eminent domain is an exception. It is a public welfare function that is
likely to result in disproportionate harm to poorer citizens of the community. This effect should disturb advocates for the less powerful, as well
as advocates for private property rights.
A property rights approach to reforming eminent domain is to limit
the power to those cases in which the government keeps title to the property - for roads, schools, and fire stations - and not for any development
under private ownership. Such a rule would fit well with the text of the
constitutional "public use" requirement. But such a rule would also
hamstring the government's ability to foster useful urban development
projects. I suspect that most citizens see as worthwhile some category of
eminent domain in which property ends up in private hands - if not for a
new sports stadium to revive a depressed area of town, then perhaps to
assist a developer who is stymied by property "holdouts" in an effort to
bring stores and quality low-cost housing to a poor urban neighborhood
that has little of each. A governmental title rule would limit eminent
domain's potential for abuse, but at a cost, and that cost would be borne
disproportionately by poorer central cities. Other commentators have
suggested that courts should set aside eminent domain when it appears,
on balance, that the project wouldn't truly benefit the public. Such a test,
however, even if feasible for the courts, would play into the hands of
corporate developers and other wealthy landowners, who would be more
able to marshal the lawyers, experts, and financial data necessary to win
such a claim.
I propose that the rule of law focus on the identity of the targets of
eminent domain. It is the perceived unfairness toward these citizens,
after all, that gives rise to the call for a tighter law of eminent domain.
Because governments pay fair market value in compensation to landowners, law need not worry much about repeat-player developers or
most commercial landowners. Instead, the law should have sympathy for
homeowners and renters who are uprooted from their houses and apartments. It should pay special scrutiny to cases in which most of the resi324. See, e.g., Boudreaux, supra note 117, at 503-06 (arguing that poor persons are less likely
to be able to shop for governments efficiently, and that governments compete to discourage poor
residents).
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dential victims are poor or are racial minorities. In these cases, the
courts would act to reinforce the representation of these citizens, who are
less likely to have their interests considered and their voices heard by
local government. The current United Supreme Court is, of course,
unlikely to explicitly adopt such a rule anytime soon. Nonetheless, eminent domain could be crafted to prohibit governments from using eminent domain to harm those persons who have faced the greatest obstacles
in achieving the American dream. Such a system would allow eminent
domain to play a role in helping, not hindering, the cause of social justice.

